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Background: This thesis represents the application of cognitive 
psychology, specifically phenomena reported in the concepts and categorisation 
literature, to autism research. The studies reported here tested the claim that 
prototype formation and therefore prototype effects are impaired in autism (Klinger 
& Dawson, 2001). The claim is supported by other theories: weak central coherence 
(Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994) and a reduced perception of similarity (Plaisted, 
2001). Additionally, supporting evidence suggests that individuals with autism do 
not show prototype effects (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Plaisted, O'Riordan, Aitken, & 
Killcross, Submitted). Method: There were three studies each with two participant 
groups: high-functioning children with autism and a matched control group of 
typically developing children. The first study used stimulus cards to test whether 
prototype effects were shown in recognition memory (Experiments 3.1 - 3.3). The 
second used dot pattern stimuli presented on computer to compare the influences of 
recognition and categorisation on prototype effects (Experiment 4.1). The final study 
used stimulus cards to investigate the influence of ambiguity on children's 
categorisation responses (Experiments 5.1 - 5.3). Results: The majority of 
participants with autism demonstrated prototype effects similar to those of controls in 
all three studies. Other findings reported for the autism groups were reduced visual 
recognition memory for old, meaningless stimuli (Experiment 4.1) and reduced 
category membership decisions (Experiment 5.3). Conclusion: The convergence of 
experimental findings showed that most children with autism do show intact 
prototype effects. These findings limit the theoretical claims presented earlier. The 
discussion (Chapter 6) also summarises suggestions for future research into visual 
recognition memory and category membership decisions. Finally it is argued that a 
major implication of the research presented in this thesis together with other relevant 
findings is that considerable instability exists (on whether or not participant group 
differences are shown) both with the demonstration of prototype effects and in the 
perception of similarity. It is argued that elucidating the causes of instability in the 
latter is a priority for future research. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Autism and the psychological theories of autism: their 
characteristics 
1.1 What is autism? 
The first descriptions of autism 
By reference to early psychiatric literature, historical accounts, myths and 
legends, Frith (1989) makes a cogent case that the constellation of characteristics, 
now referred to as autism, has existed for centuries. However, autism and the closely 
related condition, Asperger syndrome (AS) were not delineated until the early 1940s. 
Working independently, Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944, 1991) published case 
studies of children, that each author viewed as constituting a new and hitherto 
undefined syndrome. Both Kanner and Asperger emphasised the pervasive social 
difficulties. For example, when children visited Kanner's office, they completely 
ignored all other people in the room and headed straight for the toys and objects that 
caught their interest. In a similar vein, Asperger commented on the tendency of 
the children to act on their own impulses and interests without concern for the social 
consequences. His case studies detail many examples of the ensuing conflict within 
both family and school environments. Both Kanner and Asperger observed 
numerous other features: Both were struck by a lack of eye contact, stereotypies 
(repetitive movements) and resistance to change. There are also contrasts between 
the accounts. For example, Asperger's cases possessed fluent and communicative 
language, whereas Kanner's cases had little useful language. There is also some 
indication that Asperger's cases were more intellectually able: He commented on 
their capacity for abstract thought. Kanner, instead, emphasised the rote learning 
skills of the children that he observed. Asperger also commented on the clumsiness 
of his cases - both at the level of gross motor co-ordination (used in school sports) 
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and fine motor co-ordination (used in handwriting). However, Kanner, whilst 
observing a clumsy gait in some of his cases, specifically highlighted their manual 
dexterity. 
Coincidentally and perhaps misleadingly, Asperger and Kanner both 
described their cases as autistic, a term coined to describe an entirely distinct 
psychiatric disorder: schizophrenia (Bleuler, 1911). Bleuler used the term to convey 
a sense of shutting off from the environment as well as the predominance of an inner 
mental life. Kanner's use of the name autism has remained in place to refer to cases 
that resemble his. In contrast, the syndrome that Asperger described later came to 
bear his name. 
The diagnosis of autism and AS 
According to Happe and Frith (1996) autism has formed a distinct 
psychiatric category since it was first included in an internationally agreed diagnostic 
system: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd edition (DSM 
III) published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA, 1980). This 
innovation followed converging evidence that suggested that Kanner's observations 
constituted a distinct syndrome (e.g. Rutter, 1978). An influential study carried out 
by Wing and Gould (1979) provided further justification for viewing autism in this 
way. These researchers studied all children, within a former London borough, who 
possessed either learning difficulties, or any of the autistic features described by 
Kanner, or both. Wing and Gould observed that a "triad" of impairments in 
socialisation, communication, and imagination tended to co-occur in classic 
"Kanner-type" cases thus reinforcing the notion of an autistic syndrome. The study 
went further in demonstrating that this triad occurred in a wider sample of children. 
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Additionally, the researchers recorded considerable heterogeneity in how 
impairments were expressed. For example, children exhibited social abnormalities in 
different ways: some were withdrawn and aloof, others showed unusual passivity, 
and others were socially active but in an inappropriate manner. 
The study also gave rise to the notion of an autistic continuum. Wing and 
Gould observed a great range in ability amongst individuals possessing the "triad of 
symptoms". These ranged from individuals with serious intellectual and physical 
disabilities to whom social impairments were an additional problem through to very 
able individuals with subtle social deficits. Happe and Frith (1996) point out that the 
concept of a triad informed the next update of the DSMIIIR (APA, 1987). 
Asperger's original paper received little research interest until Wing's (1981) review 
and case studies. It was not until the latest version of the DSM-IV, APA, (1994) and 
the International Classification of Diseases (lCD-10, World Health Organisation, 
1993) that AS has been included as a separate diagnostic category. 
Both autism and AS are located within a wider spectrum of pervasive 
developmental disorders (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). These are loosely described as 
having severe and pervasive impairments in the development of social and 
communicative functions or displaying stereotyped patterns of behaviour or interest. 
Furthermore, such abnormalities are usually observable in the first few years of life. 
In common with other psychiatric disorders, autism and AS are diagnosed according 
to behavioural criteria. These still reflect some of the central observations made by 
Kanner and Asperger. Both DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for autism and 
AS require observed abnormality in reciprocal social interaction. This might include, 
for example, "a failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental 
level." (pp. 70&77, DSM-IV). Additionally, both diagnostic systems require the 
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presence of stereotypies, repetitive behaviour, or restricted interests. An example of 
these would be an, "apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional 
routines or rituals." (pp. 71&77, DSM-IV). The diagnostic systems state an 
additional necessary requirement for the diagnosis of autism: a qualitative 
impainnent in communicative language. This might include, "stereotyped and 
repetitive use of language or idiosyncratic use of language." (p.70, DSM-IV). Also, 
it is necessary for delays or abnonnalities to be present before 3 years of age in a 
least one of the three following areas: social interaction, communicative language, or 
symbolic play. In contrast, the criteria for AS state that there should be no (clinically 
significant) abnonnalities or delays in these areas. Additionally, there is no 
requirement for impainnents in communicative language. 
In practice, the use of the lCD-10 and DSM-IV to differentiate between AS 
and higher functioning autism (HF A) can be highly problematic. The following two 
examples to illustrate this point will be taken from the DSM-IV because the 
provision of extra guidelines appears to make it the stronger of the two for 
differential diagnosis: 
Example 1: There are cases for which the guidelines are self-contradictory. 
The DSM-IV states a default rule: An AS diagnosis is not made if criteria are met for 
autism. It also states that the lack of language delay associated with AS distinguishes 
the disorder from autism. This means that all individuals who meet the criteria for 
both disorders should receive a diagnosis of autism. However, a subset of these 
individuals without language delay should simultaneously receive an additional 
diagnosis of AS. Herein lies the conflict: for the diagnostic schedules do not admit 
dual diagnosis! 
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Example 2: If any candidate meets the criteria for both AS and autism and 
possesses any delay or abnormalities in the functions of communicative language, 
social interaction, or play (before age 3) the application of the above mentioned 
default rule will result in a diagnosis of autism. Therefore, even though the criteria 
for AS state delays in functioning must not reach clinical significance, in practice it 
is necessary to demonstrate that development in these key areas is completely 
typical. The difficulty lies in establishing this. Usually, parents supply relevant 
information on early development. Gillberg and Ehlers (1998) discuss the inherent 
difficulties in relying on parental report for establishing normality in language 
development. Parents may either not notice or remember abnormalities and delays: 
particularly the more subtle ones. The same points apply to the other areas of 
functioning. 
The lack of delineation provided by the diagnostic systems reflects current 
controversy in the field over the differential diagnosis of AS from HF A. Some 
authors regard AS and HF A as separate disorders, (Klin, Volkmar, Sparrow, 
Cicchetti, & Rourke, 1995; Rhinehart, Bradshaw, Brereton, & Tonge, 2001; 
Rhinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2000, 2001). Others such as Wing 
(1998) and Miller and Ozonoff (2000) conclude that there is no evidence to justify 
regarding the two syndromes as separate disorders. (This is discussed further in 
Chapter 2.) 
Aetiology and Epidemiology 
The prevalence of autism depends on which diagnostic criteria are used. 
According to Wing (1993), the incidence of classic "Kanner-type" autism has 
remained similar to the first epidemiological study: at about 4.5: 10,000 (Lotter, 
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1966). The wider spectrum of autistic disorder, as defined by Wing's (1988) triad, is 
much more prevalent. This is estimated at about 1 per 1000 (Gillberg & Coleman, 
2000). The incidence of AS in school-age children appears to be somewhat higher, 
estimated as 3-5 per 1000 (Gillberg & Coleman, 2000). The gender ratio for both 
disorders is striking. More males than females are affected and population studies 
indicate that the boy: girl ratio for both disorders is very similar: between 3: 1 and 4: 1 
(Gillberg & Coleman, 2000). Another characteristic associated with autism is the 
additional presence of learning disabilities (defined by an IQ below 70) in 75% of 
cases (Lockyer & Rutter, 1970; Wing, 1993). 
Initially, it was believed that autism was the result of a damaged personality 
structure caused by adverse parenting (Bettelheim, 1967; Kanner, 1949). However, 
the prevalence of associated learning difficulties (Lockyer & Rutter, 1970) and a 
high incidence of epilepsy (Rutter, 1970) pointed to a biological cause. In keeping 
with the biological view is the fact that the most consistent evidence to date suggests 
that autism is largely genetic in origin. In support of this assertion, Rutter (1999) 
cites studies comparing the concordance rates of monozygotic (identical) twins with 
those of dizygotic (fraternal) twins (Bailey et al., 1995; Steffenburg et al., 1989). 
The following concordance rates refer to the percentage of twin-pairs where both 
twins received a diagnosis of autism. The concordance rates for the monozygotic 
twins ranged from 60 to 91 %. In contrast, concordance rates for the dyzogotic twins 
were 0%. Thus, it appears that a predisposition for autism increases dramatically 
with an increase in genetic material shared with an affected other. 
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1.2 The psychological theories of autism 
Preface 
The psychological study of autism has spanned just over six decades. This 
has been sufficient time for major paradigm shifts to occur in the study of the mind. 
These shifts in tum have been reflected in theorising about autism. Psychodynamic 
models were predominant in the late 40s and 50s. In Section 1.1, mention has 
already been made of two theoretical viewpoints influenced by these: the 
psychogenic theories of autism (Bettelheim, 1967; Kanner, 1949). The domination 
of the psychodynamic models floundered on a lack of empirical evidence and the 
behaviourist models of the 1960s and 1970s superseded these. The application of 
these theories to autism involved the use of operant conditioning to both study and 
change behaviour (e.g. Ferster, 1961; Jensen & Womack, 1967; Lovaas, Schreibman, 
Koegel, & Rehm, 1971; McConnell, 1967). Behaviourism's neglect of the mind 
eventually triggered the third paradigm shift, dubbed the "cognitive revolution" 
(Gardner, 1985). 
The following review will focus on theories of autism developed with this 
cognitive approach as the prevailing theoretical backdrop. This backdrop can be 
roughly characterised by Gardner's list of key features possessed by cognitive 
science. Some of these are as follows: Cognitive scientists by necessity posit their 
own distinct level of analysis: that of mental representations, described in the form of 
symbols, rules, schemata, and images, for example. These are not observable but are 
deduced from the relations between input (in the form of sensory stimuli) and output 
(behaviour). Additionally, in cognitive science human thought is seen as a form of 
information processing with the computer playing a central role as a model for this. 
The discipline is characterised by an attempt to partition out the influences of affect, 
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behavioural and mental context, and historical and cultural influences. Gardner also 
cites interdisciplinary work as another feature of cognitive science. He gives the 
example of linguistic processing that has drawn upon evidence from psychology, 
neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. 
The reader may observe from the following review that the theories vary 
considerably in the extent to which they have been influenced by the cognitive 
revolution. Some such as the theory of mind (TOM; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985) and executive function deficits (Russell, 1997) with their emphasis on 
cognitive deficits, firm information processing viewpoint, and interdisciplinary roots 
reflect a strong influence. At the other end of the spectrum, it is arguable whether 
Hobson's theory (1982,1989,1993) with its emphasis on viewing cognition, affect, 
and conation as a unitary whole, as well as its focus on inter-personal relatedness, 
belongs within the cognitive revolution at all. None the less, Hobson's theory has 
been included within this review as an influential contemporary of the other theories. 
The primary purpose of this review is to introduce the theories and only brief 
mention is made of empirical evidence. 
Theories of autism within the cognitive revolution: A proliferation of basic level 
'deficits' 
The title of this section is derived from the fact that each theory outlined 
here has, as a unique defining characteristic, one or more particular abnormalities of 
function which are considered "basic". The word basic here is used in one of the 
senses that Hobson (1993) used the word meaning a primary cause of several 
secondary features of autism. The first account to be covered here is that of 
Hermelin and O'Connor (1970). They built upon earlier research in the 1960s and 
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1970s that indicated a deficit in autism in the cognitive skills of sequencing and 
abstraction. After completing a series of experiments with a lower functioning 
autism (LFA) group, (i.e. those with learning disabilities), Herme1in and O'Connor 
concluded that the thought processes and memory of children with autism were less 
dependant upon meaning than children without autism. They proposed that a 
cognitive deficit involving abstraction or conceptual inference lay behind the 
observed behavioural and social abnormalities. 
Rutter (1999) pointed out that researchers at this time became aware of the 
necessity of looking at possible ways in which such a cognitive deficit might lead to 
abnormalities in social reciprocity and social functioning. One approach to 
understanding the social difficulties was provided by Hobson (1982, 1989, 1993). 
Hobson argued from clinical experience that individuals with autism were lacking a 
particular biologically innate capacity: namely the ability to directly perceive, 
empathise with, and respond to the observable communicative cues given out by 
other people. He also argued that such inability prevents individuals with autism 
forming interpersonal relations, and this lack of subjective experience then causes a 
lack of understanding of the minds of other people. Hobson's account is unique with 
respect to the theories discussed here because of his emphasis on considering 
conation, affect, and cognition jointly when considering autism. Another unique 
feature of Hobson's account is that he believed that the basic units of analysis should 
include the nature of interpersonal interaction as well as the individual's thoughts, 
beliefs, and feelings. 
Another account of social abnormalities was provided by the TOM 
hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1985). This represented an integration of theoretical 
and empirical work from philosophy, primatology, and developmental psychology. 
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Premack and Woodruff (1978) first introduced the phrase "theory of mind" in their 
study of non-human primates. They argued that in order to predict and explain the 
behaviour of others it is necessary first to be able to attribute mental states to self and 
others. To have this ability is to possess a TOM. Dennett (1978) and Pylyshyn 
(1978) both commented that a capacity to form second order representations (e.g. "C 
believes that E believes that pIt, Dennett, 1978, p. 569) was a prerequisite for a TOM. 
Leslie (1987) developed earlier work in specifying a computational model of meta-
representational development. This specified a mechanism by which the ability to 
form second order representations developed. According to Leslie such a capacity 
does not emerge, during typical development, until about two years of age. In 
addition, Leslie argued that this capacity was necessary for pretend play and 
eventually developed into a TOM. 
Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) noted the lack of pretend play, the social 
difficulties of children with autism, and the fact that these impairments appeared to 
be independent ofIQ. They hypothesised that this pair of impairments had a 
common cause: specifically a lack of second order representations and a concomitant 
TOM. To test their hypothesis, Baron-Cohen et al. adapted a false belief task 
developed by Wimmer and Pemer (1983). Baron-Cohen et al.'s version involved the 
enactment of a play with two doll protagonists. In the absence of one of the 
protagonists "Sally" a desired object (a marble) was moved from the location that 
"Sally left it in" to a new hiding place. The critical test question was designed to test 
ability to hold second order representations: "Where will Sally look for her marble?" 
(p.41). Participants answered correctly if they managed to suppress their own 
knowledge of the marble's true location and take into account Sally'S "false belief': 
that the marble was where "she had left it". Baron-Cohen et al. found that the 
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majority ofLFA children failed the task whereas control groups with lower 
chronological ages (CAs) and mental ages (MAs) tended to pass. Hence, the authors 
concluded that individuals with autism have a particular cognitive deficit: a failure to 
employ a TOM. 
In contrast to Hobson's and Baron-Cohen's focus on explaining the social 
abnormalities of autism, the advent of weak central coherence theory represented an 
attempt to account for the cognitive deficits in autism. Frith (1989) coined the term 
"central coherence" to refer to the natural human tendency to "draw together diverse 
information to construct higher-level meaning in context" (Frith & Happe, 1994, p. 
121 ). Frith argued that this tendency is weakened in autism. 
Supporting evidence spans a range of processing levels. For example, there 
is evidence of difficulty integrating high-level verbal semantic information. In Frith 
and Snowling's (1983) study, LFA children failed to use sentence context to 
disambiguate homographs. For instance, they tended to use inappropriate 
pronunciations of the word bow when reading the following sentences: "He had a 
pink bow" and "He made a deep bow". These findings have also been replicated 
with an HFA group (Happe, 1997). 
Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (2001) have reported an example of weak 
visuoconceptual coherence. They found that HF A and AS adults were impaired at an 
object identification task that required the ability to integrate object fragments 
conceptually. There is also evidence of weak visuospatial coherence. For example, 
LF A performance on the embedded figures task was superior to that of controls 
(Shah & Frith, 1983). This test requires the respondent to locate a simple geometric 
figure (e.g. a triangle) buried within a more complex figure (e.g. a picture of a pram). 
20 
Happe (1994) suggested the weaker central coherence possessed by the LF A group 
meant that they were less susceptible to the gestalt of the complex figure. 
Additionally, Happe (1996) reported an example of difficulty with low-level 
perceptual integration: She found that LF A children tended not to succumb to visual 
illusions. Happe argued that these children failed to integrate the relevant parts of 
the figures with their "illusion-inducing context". However, Ropar and Mitchell 
(1999, 2001) failed to replicate this finding with three separate experiments. They 
found that children with autism and AS were susceptible to visual illusions. This 
was the case whether the participants responded verbally, as they did in Happe's 
study, or whether they responded manually. The latter required participants to press 
computer keys to alter shapes and lines to match a target. The leading explanation 
offered for the failure to replicate Happe's findings was that sub-groups existed 
within the autism population. Happe happened to sample a group that was immune 
to visual illusions whereas Ropar and Mitchell sampled groups that were susceptible 
to these effects. The moot issue then is which sub-group is the more representative 
of the autism population as whole. As Ropar and Mitchell (2001) pointed out, their 
findings could be seen as more representative because they tested more samples from 
the autism population. 
The theories, discussed so far, have sought (at least initially) to account for 
secondary characteristics within a single domain: either social or non-social. One 
theory that from its outset extended to cover both social and non-social secondary 
deficits was the executive dysfunction hypothesis of autism (Russell, 1997). This 
proposed that a severe and early impairment in working memory resulted in 
pervasive deficits in abilities to plan and execute complex behaviour. Such 
behaviour, Russell argued, includes social concept formation, which requires the 
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integration of infonnation within context and over time. Russell suggested that the 
notion of an executive dysfunction theory of autism "probably" arose first in the 
writing of Damasio and colleages (e.g. Damasio & Maurer, 1978). However, key 
papers triggering mainstream research interest in the area were not written until 
1991, when three papers were produced. 
Ozonoff, Pennington, and Rogers (1991) showed that executive measures 
were at least as good as TOM tasks in distinguishing an HF A group from controls. 
Ozonoff, Rogers, and Pennington (1991) compared HF A and AS participants on both 
TOM and executive function measures. They found again that the HF A group was 
deficient on both: however, the AS group was deficient on the executive function 
measure alone. Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, and Tidswell (1991) tested LF A children, 
with control groups matched on verbal mental ages (VMAs) between 3 and 5 years, 
on a test of strategic deception. This task was adapted from one designed originally 
to test "TOM" in chimpanzees. Russell et al. 's (1991) task required the participant to 
"deceive" the experimenter by pointing to a false location for a salient and desirable 
item: a piece of chocolate. When the chocolate was visible to participants, the LF A 
group alone, tended to fail the deception task by pointing to the true location of the 
chocolate. Russell et al. (1991) observed the perseverative nature of this response: 
The LF A group persisted in pointing to the baited box despite repeated learning trials 
and corrective feedback. These authors argued that the TOM hypothesis was unable 
to account for the steadfast refusal of the LF A group to learn deceptive behaviour. 
Instead, Russell et al. (1991) suggested that failure on the task was really due to an 
inability to shift cognitive set away from the chocolate: a very salient stimulus. A 
follow up experiment, designed to compare directly these two hypotheses, confirmed 
this view (Hughes & Russell, 1993). 
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The only theory that straddles both social and non-social deficits at the basic 
level is the extreme male brain theory of autism (Baron-Cohen, 1999,2002,2003). 
An explanation of this theory starts with the study of gender differences. Baron-
Cohen proposed two new dimensions of variability: empathising and system ising. 
Empathising is defined as the attribution of mental states to other people and the 
production of a reciprocal affective responses to that of others. Systemising is 
defined as the use of "if-then rules" to understand and predict the behaviour of 
variables within a system. Examples of systems include technical ones (e.g. 
computers), and abstract ones (e.g. mathematics). According to Baron-Cohen, these 
if-then rules have most explanatory power when applied to systems that are lawful, 
finite, and deterministic. Human behaviour possesses none of these characteristics 
and empathising is the best means of predicting it. 
According to Baron-Cohen (2003), within the human population, the 
normal distributions of male and female systemising ability are slightly separated, 
with the male distribution shifted in the direction of high ability. Conversely, a 
similar separation of the popUlation distributions occurs for empathising ability, with 
the female distribution shifted in the direction of high ability. These two dimensions, 
systemising and empathising, are used to create a taxonomy of "brain types". For 
example, an individual with a female brain (not necessarily a female) would show 
strength in empathising and weakness in systemising. Conversely, an individual 
possessing a male brain type (not necessarily a male) would show the opposite 
pattern, with strength in systemising and weakness in empathising. 
Baron-Cohen (2002) suggested that autism could be characterised as the 
possession of a more exaggerated pattern of the male-brain, that is, the possession of 
extremely good systemising and extremely poor empathising. This notion originated 
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in the writings of Asperger (1944) who suggested that autism may represent an 
exaggeration of patterns of intelligence that are typically male. Baron-Cohen cites a 
variety of evidence suggesting that individuals with autism are worse at empathising 
than typical males. For example, on TOM tests girls out perform boys who in tum 
outperform LF A children (Happe, 1995). Also, children with HF A or AS are worse 
than males at recognizing faux pas (Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan, Stone, Jones, & 
Plaisted, 1999). Additionally various pieces of evidence are cited for the superior 
systemising skills of individuals with autism. For example, obsessional interests 
displayed by children with autism represent tend to focus on topics that appeal more 
to males than females. Such topics are "closed systems" such as train spotting 
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 1999). 
The final major area of study to be discussed here is the study of attentional 
deficits in autism. This line of enquiry has run like a thread along side and 
interacting with the other theoretical developments. As Barkley's (1996) brief 
review indicates, there are many definitions of attention. Many viewpoints converge 
in considering attention a function that selects certain processes or information from 
others for additional processing. Certain behavioural abnormalities observed in 
autism led researchers to consider attentional processes. These abnormalities include 
a tendency to fixate on small details of the environment to the exclusion of other 
information (Bryson, Wainwright-Sharp, & Smith, 1990) and a tendency towards 
perseverative behaviour (Russell et al., 1991). 
In addition, the advent of the TOM theory has lead to interest in deficits in 
joint attention. This term describes the situation where two or more individuals are 
attending to the same phenomenon. Examples include following another's gaze and 
non-verbal communicative acts such as pointing and showing objects to others. 
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Leekam and Moore (2001) cite a number of studies demonstrating a lack of joint 
attention in children with autism (for example, Baron-Cohen, 1989; McEvoy, 
Rogers, & Pennington, 1993). Various explanations for this have been offered from 
within various theoretical perspectives. Hobson (1993) viewed the case of joint 
attention deficits as a primary deficit in intersubjective relatedness. Baron-Cohen et 
al. (1985) viewed the origins of the deficit as a purely cognitive one. The deficits 
prevent the child from forming the second order relations that are necessary for 
understanding the relationship between another person and the object holding that 
person's interest. This is viewed as part of a larger TOM impairment. An executive 
dysfunction explanation of the joint attention deficit instead suggests that the primary 
causes are problems in disengaging and shifting visual attention (Pennington & 
Ozonoff, 1996; Russell, 1996). 
This concludes a brief overview of one of the overarching theoretical 
paradigms governing research into autism and some of the main theoretical areas 
within it. The next chapter will introduce another theoretical area upon which this 
thesis is based. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Prototype effects in autism: theory and method 
2.1 Theory 
The focus in Section 2.1 is on the study of concepts and categorisation in 
autism. This topic was briefly alluded to in Chapter 1 with the mention of Hermelin 
and O'Connor's work and their conclusion that many social and behavioural 
characteristics of individuals with autism may be attributable to a cognitive deficit in 
abstracting and using concepts. This topic will be discussed further after the 
following review of concepts and categorisation as reported in the mainstream 
literature. 
Brief review of concepts and categorisation 
The formation of concepts and how they are employed in 
categorisation has long been of interest to psychologists. The classical view of 
concepts dominated the field until the 1970s. (See Hampton, 1997, and Murphy, 
2002, for a review.) This view held that concepts were represented by shared 
properties that were individually necessary and jointly sufficient to define the 
concept. For example, the defining properties of a square are that the item has a 
closed figure, four sides, sides of equal length and equal angles. Categorisation was 
thought to proceed by means of simple if ... then rules. If, for example, a figure 
possessed all four properties listed above then it would be classified as a square. 
In practice, attempts to list defining features for many concepts have proven 
unsuccessful (Smith & Medin, 1981). By the mid-1970s, it had become apparent 
that such a view does not describe adequately how many real-world categorisation 
decisions are made. For instance, people perceive typicality differences when 
making category membership decisions and tend to agree on which items are more 
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typical than others. For example, apples are rated as a better example of fruit than 
water melons (Rosch, 1975a). Such typicality effects are not predicted from the 
classical view under which category membership is regarded as either present or 
absent. Furthermore, the purported use of if ... then rules cannot account for 
evidence that category boundaries are 'fuzzy' (Medin & Smith, 1984; Rosch, 1978). 
On certain category membership decisions people disagree with each other and show 
inconsistency in their own decisions over time (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). 
For example, for the category furniture participants disagreed with each other and 
showed inconsistency with their own decisions over time on items of intermediate 
typicality such as bookends. This was not found to be the case for typical items (e.g. 
chair) and non-category items (e.g. cucumber). 
An alternative to the classical view was the idea that many categories are 
represented by prototypes (best examples of the categories) and that these provide a 
summary of information in the category (Rosch, 197 5b). From this viewpoint the 
categorisation of novel exemplars is carried out on the basis of how similar an 
exemplar is to the relevant category prototype: the greater this similarity, the greater 
the probability of category membership (Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976). A wide 
variety of categories encompassed the prototype view. These included natural 
language superordinate categories (e.g.furniture, vehicle) and natural language basic 
level categories (e.g. chair, car). In these cases, similarity was defined by the 
number of attributes (e.g. you can eat it) in common (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). 
Similarity could also be defined by some metric such as size. For example, Reed 
(1972) created prototype schematic faces where attributes such as the length of the 
nose were the average of those in the study set. 
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Alternative accounts of conceptual representation, exemplar views, regard 
concepts as being represented by individual category instances (Medin & Schaffer, 
1978; Nosofsky, 1988). Exemplar views can also account for the sort of typicality 
phenomena described earlier (Hampton, 1997; Murphy, 2002). According to these 
views, the items receiving the highest typicality ratings are the ones that bear greatest 
similarity to most category members. The fuzziness of category borders is 
attributable to the fact that borderline exemplars are equally similar to members of 
two or more categories. 
In support of the prototype view, similarity between category exemplars and 
the corresponding prototype determines a wide range of learning and categorisation 
responses: for example, speed of classification and production order of items in a 
generation task (Rosch et aI., 1976). Similarity also determines prototype effects. 
These can be observed in recognition memory where individuals tend to display false 
recognition to a previously unstudied prototype. Also characteristic of the effect is 
the fact that the degree of similarity between the exemplar and the prototype, is 
reflected in recognition levels: the higher the similarity, the more likely a positive 
recognition response (Cabeza, Bruce, Kato, & Oda, 1999; Omohundro, 1981; Solso 
& McCarthy, 1981). A similar prototype effect has been observed using 
categorisation. Unstudied prototypes are categorised with an accuracy that is at least 
equal to that of previously studied but less typical exemplars (Metcalfe & Fisher, 
1986; Posner & Keele, 1968). Exemplar views also account for prototype effects by 
assuming that responses are determined by the mean similarity between a target 
exemplar and other relevant category members stored in memory (Hintzman & 
Ludlam, 1980; Nosofsky, 1991). 
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Concepts and categorisation in autism 
The idea that conceptual difficulties might be a critical feature of autism 
was expressed much earlier than Hermelin and O'Connor by writers such as 
Scheerer, Rothmann and Goldstein (1945) and Rimland (1964). These suggested 
that autism is characterised by an over-reliance on concrete thinking and an inability 
to form and use abstract concepts. Since then the picture has been somewhat mixed. 
For example, Ungerer and Sigman (1987) found no difference between LFA children 
and controls on the ability to categorise on a single basis (e.g. colour or form.) 
Tager-Flusberg (1985a, 1985b) also found that LF A children showed comparable 
performance to controls in the ability to categorise exemplars into basic level 
categories (e.g. boat, bird) and superordinate categories (e.g. food, tool). 
Furthermore, prototypicality affected the responses of all participant groups in a 
similar way. Fewer errors were made classifying prototypical items than classifying 
more peripheral category members. However, Shulman, Yirmiya, and Greenbaum 
(1995) found that LFA children performed worse than controls in a free sorting task 
in which participants selected their own bases for categorising representative objects 
such as trees or animals. Also, Dunn, Gomes, and Sebastian (1996) found an 
abnormal response to prototypicality. Participants completed word fluency tasks. 
HF A children generated a lower proportion of prototypical responses than controls 
when asked to produce as many examples of animals and vehicles as possible. 
Klinger and Dawson (1995, 2001) characterised the pattern of categorisation 
abilities in autism by proposing a dissociation: specifically that individuals with 
autism behave in the manner predicted by the classical model of concepts. They rely 
exclusively upon rule-based categorisation because of difficulty with one aspect of 
concept formation: abstracting and using prototypes. Although Tager-Flusberg's 
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(1985a, 1995b) studies demonstrated that LF A participants are as susceptible to the 
influence of prototypicality as controls, Klinger and Dawson (2001) argued that 
studies such as these only demonstrate the ability to categorise without revealing 
whether or not individuals with autism form novel concepts in the same manner as 
controls. 
In support of the dissociation, Klinger and Dawson (1995, 2001) observed 
that children with autism are able to infer rules during the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test and similar set shifting tasks (Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; Berger, 
Van Spaendonck, Horstink, Buytenhuijs, & et al., 1993; Hughes, Russell, & Robbins, 
1994). The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task requires respondents to sort cards into 
categories according to three possible dimensions (colour, shape, and number). The 
sorting basis shifts without warning throughout the task and the participant discovers 
and uses the correct principle via feedback from the experimenter. (Individuals with 
autism were able to discover and apply the rules but had difficulty switching to new 
ones. This sort of difficulty, however, is attenuated with computerised versions of 
the task, Ozonoff, 1995). 
From clinical observation and anecdotal evidence, Klinger and Dawson 
(1995), formed the view that individuals with autism persist in rule-use on occasions 
where such a rigid approach is SUb-optimal and where a prototype-based form of 
categorisation would be more appropriate. For example, these authors report the 
frustration of a father who tried to warn his adolescent autistic son not to interact 
with strangers. The problem was that his son kept on asking for a set of criteria that 
were necessary and sufficient for this concept. In a similar vein, Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Stone, and Rutherford (1999) reported their observations of Case DB, 
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a highly intelligent man with AS, who admitted attempting to codify social behaviour 
as a set of formal rules in an effort to understand it. 
Evidence suggesting that individuals with autism are unable to abstract prototypes 
and associated theories 
To test the notion that prototype formation is impaired in autism, Klinger 
and Dawson (2001) compared prototype-based categorisation with rule-based 
categorisation for three groups: an LF A group, a Down Syndrome group (both with 
an average CA of 14 years and an average VMA, of 6-7 years) and a typically 
developing group (average CA: 7 years). The stimuli were schematic animals very 
similar to those used in studies of infant categorisation (e.g. Younger, 1990). Several 
categories were used: Each was organised around a central prototype that possessed 
features (e.g. tails) that were a mean size of those possessed by other category 
members. 
All participants completed three conditions. Two required rule-based 
categorisation: The categorisation rule was either stated or left implicit. One 
condition required prototype-based categorisation. Study phases for all conditions 
involved familiarisation with a named target category (e.g. "Mip"). In the rule-based 
conditions, a single feature such as a long foot defined the target categories. The test 
phases progressed by asking participants to select the target category member from a 
pair containing a non-member (as a lure). Both target and lure were identical save 
for the presence or absence of the feature defining category membership (such as the 
long foot). In the test phase of the prototype condition, participants were again asked 
to select a target category member from a pair. This comprised an unstudied 
category prototype (the target) and a novel composite: a category member which 
31 
possessed individual features that had appeared in the study phase but in a novel 
combination. If, during any of the test phases, participants responded that both 
members of the pair were category members, they were instructed to select the best 
one. Only the typically developing group behaved as if they had abstracted 
prototype representations by selecting the prototype at levels significantly above 
chance. Neither of the selections made by the clinical groups differed from chance. 
By contrast, in the rule-based conditions, all participant groups selected category 
members at levels that were above chance. The authors' main conclusion was that 
individuals with autism and Down syndrome had impairments in prototype 
formation. 
Dunn et al. 's finding that HF A participants generated a lower proportion of 
prototypical items is consistent also with this account. In addition, one other study 
found that individuals with autism failed to show prototype effects. Plaisted, 
O'Riordan, Aitken, and Killcross (Submitted), also described in Plaisted (2001), 
created two categories of 10-pointed, coloured, geometric shapes. Two shapes were 
designated prototypes and exemplars were generated from each by distorting the 
locations of the points. HF A adults and a normal control group were trained to 
categorise the exemplars over the course of 150 trials. A subsequent test phase 
required participants to categorise both old exemplars (presented during the study 
phase), new exemplars (unseen during study phase but representing a similar level of 
distortion from the prototype as the training exemplars) and the category prototypes. 
In general, HF A participants made more errors than controls when learning to 
categorise stimuli in the study phase. Furthermore, the control group, but not the 
HF A group, demonstrated a prototype effect, by categorising the prototype at a 
greater level of accuracy than the other exemplars. 
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These findings were accounted for in tenns of a perceptual abnonnality: that 
individuals with autism have a reduced perception of similarity and so process 
features held in common between stimuli relatively poorly and unique features 
relatively well. As discussed earlier, a prototype effect reflects perceived similarity 
between category exemplars and the prototype. Therefore, such a reduced perception 
of similarity would lead the autism group to demonstrate reduced or absent prototype 
effects. 
In addition to prototype effects, this account has been extended to a range of 
phenomena (Plaisted, 2001). For example, Plaisted et al. (1998a) presented a 
perceptual learning task to HF A adults and controls. During an initial training phase, 
participants learnt to discriminate between a pair of dot patterns that shared common 
elements (i.e. some dot positions). In the subsequent test phase, the control group 
demonstrated a perceptual learning effect: They were better able to discriminate 
between a pair of familiar patterns than between a pair of completely novel ones. 
Neither pair had been presented in the training phase but the familiar pair alone 
shared the same common elements as the training pair. The autism group failed to 
show a perceptual learning effect despite success at discriminating between patterns. 
They appeared unable to exploit the commonalities between the training and test 
phase. Plaisted et al. attributed this finding to a difficulty processing features held in 
common between the learning and transfer situations (again, a manifestation of a 
reduced perception of similarity). 
Another example of supporting evidence for this view includes the HF A 
superiority in a conjunctive visual search task (Plaisted, Q'Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 
1998b). The task is difficult for nonnal participants because they are required to 
detect a target from a field of distracters that are similar to the target (e.g. the target 
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might be a green X and the distracters would be green Ts and red Xs). Plaisted 
(2001) argued that this reduction in perceived similarity renders the task easier for 
HF A participants because for them the target is less confusable with the distracters. 
Klinger and Dawson (2001) suggested that the prototype impairment in the 
autism group might be a manifestation of another general cognitive processing 
abnormality: weak central coherence (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994). As 
discussed earlier in Chapter 1, this account holds that individuals with autism are less 
able to integrate meaningful information to extract the gist of a situation or scene. 
Klinger and Dawson argued that failure in prototype formation represents an 
example of weak central coherence because of the failure to integrate information 
over multiple experiences to abstract summary information in the form of a 
prototype. 
Aims afthesis 
The aim of this thesis is to explore impairments in prototype effects in 
autism. If prototype abstraction is faulty in autism, then decrements in prototype 
effects should be observable using a variety of stimuli and methods. 
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2.2 Methodology: Participant selection 
The clinical participants taking part in the studies reported in this thesis 
were high functioning children and adolescents with autism. In practice, those with a 
proportion ofVMA over CA of 0.7 or higher were selected. This proportion was 
determined by the availability of age and VMA-matched controls from UK 
mainstream schools. (VMA was measured by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale, 
BPVS, L. M. Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997.) 
Previously, some cognitive impairments found in LFA people that were 
attributed to autism are now considered a function of mental retardation and 
developmental delay (e.g. stimulus overselectivity, Wilhelm & Lovaas, 1976). The 
fact that Klinger and Dawson's (2001) clinical groups both had some intellectual 
impairment, means that their failure to show a prototype effect could be attributable 
to this factor. Testing HF A participants was intended to provide a more stringent 
evaluation of prototype formation in autism by eliminating the confound of 
intellectual impairment. 
This focus on the more able portion of the autistic spectrum, however, raises 
the difficulty of differential diagnosis between HF A and AS participants alluded to in 
Chapter 1. This issue was addressed in this thesis by grouping both diagnoses 
together in a single group, labelled HF A participants, and defined by a relatively 
narrow IQ banding, rather than attempting to separate out the two. (The number of 
formal AS diagnoses are stated in the method section of each experiment as 
acknowledgement that other researchers may take a different view.) Reasons for this 
combined grouping are as follows: 
The position taken in this thesis is that of Miller and Ozonoff (2000): AS is 
High-IQ autism. Miller and Ozonoff subjected a group of HF A and AS participants 
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to a battery of tests of intellectual, motor, visuospatial, and executive function 
domains. Once the superior intellectual abilities of the AS group were controlled, 
statistically via ANCOVA and by comparing IQ-matched subgroups of participants, 
no significant group differences were apparent (apart from marginally significant 
poorer fine motor control in the AS group). 
Other studies have found group differences. For example, Rhinehart, 
Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, and Tonge (2000) observed participant group differences 
on a version of a task that explored the relationship between local and global 
processing (Navon, 1977). Participants were presented with a large (global) number 
comprising smaller (local) numbers. The task was to correctly identify either the 
large or the small number. The autism group had more difficulty recognising the 
large number than their control group. In contrast, the AS group did not differ from 
their matched control group. In addition, Klin, Volkmar, Sparrow, Cicchetti, and 
Rourke (1995) found significant participant group differences on various components 
of non-verbal learning. These included motor skills, visual-motor integration, and 
visual-spatial perception. 
However, neither of these studies controlled for the higher abilities of the 
AS groups. Furthermore, Klin et al. used diagnostic criteria that were more stringent 
than those present in the ICD-I0 or DSM-IV. Wing (1998) made the point that these 
criteria probably produced many of the significant differences that were found 
between the two groups. For example, Klin et al. used motor skills as a diagnostic 
criterion. Participants that lacked these skills were assigned to the AS group and 
those that possessed them were assigned to the HFA group. Unsurprisingly, this 
particular skill significantly differentiated participant groups. 
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These observations fit well with Wing's (1998) arguments: that there is 
simply no evidence that AS exists as a separate syndrome. According to Wing, the 
two syndromes cannot be delineated by cause or neuropathology since these are 
either unknown or evidence is inconclusive. (This still appears to be the case, e.g. 
see Lotspeich et aI., 2004). In addition, Wing argued that there is no clear 
symptomatology that divides the two. She cited Klin et aI. 's study where members 
of one participant group sometimes exhibited features more commonly found in the 
other group. 
In contrast to diagnosis, it appears that IQ is highly predictive of 
symptomatology. For example, Wing (1988) described the different manifestations 
of repetitive behaviours (one diagnostic feature of autism or AS). Those with low 
IQs might insist on adopting the same body posture or show stereotypies, such as 
rocking. Those with the highest IQ express this feature intellectually or verbally 
with obsessions with accumulating facts on certain topics such as railway timetables. 
This observation provides a further rationale for defining autism groups by IQ rather 
than a diagnosis of AS or autism. 
Although there is no real evidence yet for AS as a distinct syndrome, Miller 
and Ozonoffs (2000) study, however, is far from conclusive. It may simply be that 
they failed to measure the precise syndrome delineating functions. In addition, their 
participant groups are small enough to be sensitive to any errors in diagnosis (12 for 
the HF A group and 23 for the AS group). However, several features make their 
position attractive and consistent with the methodological approach taken in this 
thesis. These include the established difficulties of diagnosis, discussed in Chapter 1, 
the lack of convincing evidence that the two syndromes are separate entities, and the 
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fact that IQ does appear to be highly predictive of differing symptomatologies in 
autism. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Prototype effects in autism: Intact in recognition memory? 
Background: There are two accounts of categorisation performance in 
autism: that there is an impairment in prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001) 
and that there is a reduced perception of similarity and an impairment in processing 
features held in common between stimuli (Plaisted et al., Submitted; Plaisted et al., 
1998a). These accounts, together with central coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Frith & 
Happe, 1994), imply a reduced or absent prototype effect in autism. Method: 
Children with autism or AS (n = 15) matched on age, gender, and verbal mental age 
with typically developing children (n = 15) completed a picture recognition task 
(Experiment 3.1). These participants also studied categories of cartoon animals 
possessing either an average prototype structure (Experiment 3.2) based on 
Younger's (1985) stimuli or a modal structure (Experiment 3.3) based on Hayes and 
Taplin's ( 1993 b) stimuli. Following the study phases, participants completed 
recognition tests comprising prototypes and other exemplars with varying degrees of 
similarity to the prototypes. Results: For both participant groups, recognition 
memory appeared intact (Experiment 3.1) and a full prototype effect in recognition 
memory was observed in both Experiment 3.2 and Experiment 3.3. Conclusions: 
The present studies fail to support predictions of impaired prototype effects in 
autism. The discussion focuses on key methodological differences between these 
studies and those that support claims that central coherence, prototype formation, and 
common feature processing are impaired in autism. 
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As stated in Chapter 2, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
demonstration of prototype effects in autism. As described earlier, two teams of 
researchers, Klinger and Dawson (2001) and Plaisted et al. (Submitted), found that 
individuals with autism failed to show prototype effects. In both cases, the display of 
these effects was assessed by means of a categorisation task presented in the test 
phase. Participants in the former study were asked to select the best example of a 
category. LF A children, in contrast to controls, tended not to select the prototype. 
Participants in the latter study completed a classic categorisation test requiring the 
classification of geometric shapes into two categories. HF A adults and adolescents, 
in contrast to controls, failed to categorise the prototype with the greatest accuracy. 
Accounts supporting impaired prototype effects in autism included 
impairment in prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001), a reduced perception 
of similarity or difficulty processing common features (Plaisted et aI., Submitted; 
Plaisted et aI., 1998a) and central coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 
1994). One implication of all these accounts is that children with autism differ in 
their use of similarity: specifically that they represent individual stimuli with very 
steep generalisation gradients and do not perceive stimuli as similar unless they are 
very close in the stimulus space. If this is the case then children with autism should 
show reduced or absent prototype effects. This prediction is consistent with both 
exemplar and prototype accounts of category learning. These two theories are alike 
in their assumption that response to unseen category members is determined by high 
similarity to previously presented stimuli. Two studies reported here, Experiment 
3.2 and Experiment 3.3, used the prototype effect in recognition memory to test the 
theories concerning prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and common 
feature processing (Plaisted et aI., 1998a). 
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Intact general recognition memory has been found in HF A children and 
adolescents (Barth, Fein, & Waterhouse, 1995; Bennetto et aI., 1996) as well as in 
AS adults (Bowler, Gardiner, Grice, & Saavalainen, 2000; Bowler, Gardiner, & 
Grice, 2000). A memory task (Experiment 3.1) was included to check that this was 
true also of the HFA children in the present study. This had the additional purpose of 
familiarising all participants with the experimental procedure. 
Experiment 3.1 
Method 
Participants. Two groups took part in the study: 15 HF A children and 15 typically 
developing controls. The participant groups were matched on gender (all 
participants were boys), individually matched on chronological age (to within four 
months), and globally matched on VMA. The children in the autism group had been 
diagnosed by clinicians as having either AS (8) or autism (7) according to established 
criteria such as those specified by the DSM-IV(American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). They were recruited from special education facilities and ranged in 
chronological age from 8 years and 9 months to 13 years and 11 months. Children in 
the control group were recruited from local schools in South East England. Their 
ages ranged from 8 years and 5 months to 14 years and two months. VMA was 
assessed by the BPVS (L. M. Dunn et aI., 1997). Nonverbal mental age was assessed 
using Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1996). Table 3.1 summarises 
participant characteristics. 
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Table 3.1 Participant characteristics 
Chronological age (years) 
M 
SD 
VMA (years) 
M 
SD 
Range 
BPVS raw scores 
M 
SD 
Range 
RPM raw scores 
M 
SD 
Range 
Autism Group 
(n = 15) 
11.71 
1.65 
11.68 
3.02 
5.67 - 17 
107.40 
21.58 
58 - 145 
38.27 
7.08 
28 - 52 
Control 
(n = 15) 
11.73 
1.75 
11.51 
2.98 
6 - 17 
106.13 
20.38 
61 - 140 
35.07 
10.69 
12 - 45 
Note. VMA = verbal mental age. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale. RPM 
= Ravens Progressive Matrices. VMA was derived from the BPVS raw scores. 
Maximum group difference: t(24) = .97,p = .34 (equal variances not assumed). 
42 
Materials. All stimuli were black line drawings presented singly on white 13 cm by 
10 cm cards. There were two response cards differing only with respect to the 
relative positions, top or bottom, of two sentences: "I have seen the picture before" I 
"I have not seen the picture before". The response cards served as reminders as to 
what decision had to be made over the stimuli. In addition, once participants were 
trained in their use, these cards enabled participants to make responses without 
verbal prompts from the experimenter. 
There were 16 practice items. These were divided equally into two 
categories: plants and buildings. Each category was divided equally into study and 
test items. There were 32 memory task items. These were divided equally into two 
categories: animals and vehicles. Again, each of these categories was divided 
equally into study and test items. For both practice items and memory task items, 
half the test stimuli were "old" replicas of the study items, the remainder being novel 
items. 
Procedure. Participants were tested singly in a quiet room. The practice session was 
completed first. Participants were told that they had five seconds to study each of the 
practice study cards. Boucher and Lewis (1992) mention the difficulty of keeping 
the attention of some children focused on tasks like this so participants were 
encouraged to pay attention to the study cards by means of a straightforward 
categorisation task. They had to sort each card into one of two piles according to 
category: plants versus buildings. They were told to look at each card carefully and 
were warned that their memory for these cards would be tested. The study cards 
were shuffled and handed one at a time to each participant who was told to leave the 
card face up obscuring the other items beneath it in the pile. If the participant's 
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attention wandered, he was prompted to look at the card again and any mistakes in 
placing cards were corrected immediately by the experimenter. Participants then 
completed the practice test session. At the start, they were told that some of the test 
cards were exact copies of cards they had seen before, and some were new. They 
had to look at each card carefully and decide if they had seen the same picture 
before. They were familiarised with a response card and told to guess if unsure of 
the answer. The test cards were shuffled and placed face up in a single pile on the 
table one at a time. Participants responded in their own time by pointing to the 
relevant place on the response card. The memory task followed immediately with a 
procedure that was identical to the one described above for the practice session. 
Response card type was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results and Discussion 
The mean proportion of correct recognition responses from the memory task 
was similar for both participant groups: .87 (SD = .13) for the autism group and .81 
(SD = .17) for the controls. The difference between groups was not significant: t(28) 
= 1.05, p = .30. One sample t-tests revealed that for each group responding was 
significantly above the chance level of .5: t (14) = 11.19, p < .01 for the autism group 
and t(14) = 6.91,p < .01 for the control group. These reasonably high levels of 
memory task performance indicated successful use of the response cards by both 
participant groups and that recognition memory was intact in both groups. The 
absence of group differences suggested that performance on these two variables was 
similar for both participant groups. 
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Experiment 3.2 
In this experiment, participants were familiarised with categories that were 
very similar to those used by Klinger and Dawson (2001). The stimuli were cartoon 
animals that were organised around average prototypes. These prototypes possessed 
features (e.g. legs or nose) that were the category average in size. Following a short 
study phase participants made recognition responses to five exemplar types that were 
of decreasing similarity to the prototype. If there is a problem in integrating 
information across experience, as proposed by central coherence theory (Frith, 1989; 
Frith & Happe, 1994), and if there is an impairment in the formation of prototypes 
(Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and in processing common features (Plaisted et al., 
1998a) , then the usual prototype effect should not be replicated in the autism group 
using a recognition test. The recognition responses of the autism group should not 
reflect similarity to the prototype to the same extent as those of the control group. It 
is unlikely that such a reduced effect could be attributable to poorer recognition 
memory. This is because the autism group performed similarly to the control group 
on the memory task in Experiment 3.1. 
Method 
Participants. The same participants from Experiment 3.1 were recruited. 
Materials. The stimuli were presented on white cards identical to those used in 
Experiment 3.1. A similar method to that described in Younger (1985) and (Klinger 
& Dawson,. 2001) was used to create average category stimuli consisting of cartoon 
animals. Similarity was manipulated by varying the size of animal features. Each 
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exemplar possessed six features that were varied along a dimension with five equal 
steps from value 1 to value 6. One particular feature could have any of the six 
discrete values. Alternatively, if it belonged to the prototype, it took the average 
value (3.5 on the scale). The size of the steps between values varied across features 
but was constant for each single feature (e.g. for the "insect neck" the values 1,2,3, 
4,5, and 6 represented increments of 4mm). Exemplars varied in their global 
similarity or family resemblance (FR) to the prototype. In addition to the prototype 
(with all feature values set at 3.5), three exemplar types were generated. These 
possessed features that could take one of two possible values. The exemplar types 
with corresponding feature values in parentheses are as follows: high FR (3, 4), 
medium FR (2,5), and low FR (1,6). 
There were 16 study items, 8 "monsters" and 8 "insects", and 34 test items: 
17 from each category. The study items bore medium FR to their respective 
prototype. See Table 3.2 for a description of study item structure for insects. The 
monster study items had an identical structure. 
The test items for each category consisted of 4 replicas of study items (old 
medium FR exemplars) and 13 new items. The latter comprised one prototype and 
four items each of high, medium and low FR exemplars. Table 3.3 gives a 
description of feature values for insect test items. Monster test items had an identical 
structure. Figure 3.1 illustrates the prototype and other new test exemplars from the 
insect category. 
The studies of Klinger and Dawson (2001) and Younger (1990) each had 
two types of exemplar represented within the study sets. One type had features with 
values of 2 and 4: similar in size to those of the prototype that had features values all 
set at 3. The other exemplar type had features with values of 1 or 5: less similar to 
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the prototype features. In contrast, the study sets of the present experiments 
contained only medium FR exemplars. This single exemplar type was selected so 
that the results would reveal more information about what strategies participants 
were using. If they simply memorised single features from the study set, failed to 
integrate them, and then responded to test items on the basis of how confusable test 
item features were with study item features then recognition scores would not reveal 
a prototype effect. Medium FR exemplars would receive the highest recognition 
because they shared identical features with the study set. Also, recognition scores for 
prototype, high FR, and low FR exemplars would be very close because their 
features all differed from the most similar study item features by roughly the same 
value (1.5, 1, and 1 units respectively). If however participants were integrating the 
features to produce an average then their responses would be determined by 
similarity to this average (i.e. the prototype) and therefore would demonstrate a 
prototype effect. (The prototype, high FR, medium FR, and low FR feature values 
all differed from prototype feature values by 0, .5, 1.5, and 2.5 units respectively.) 
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Prototype High FR exemplar 
Medium FR exemplar Low FR exemplar 
Figure 3.1 Examples of average category test stimuli. All are from the insect 
category. 
Procedure. All participants completed the average category task (Experiment 3.2) 
after the memory task (Experiment 3.1) and both tasks were completed within a 
week. The instructions and procedure for the average category recognition task were 
identical to those used for the memory task except that during the study phase 
participants had to sort the cards into "monster" and "insect" categories. Also before 
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the test phase participants were warned that deciding if they had seen a card before 
might get "a bit tricky" since many of the cards might look very similar to the ones 
they had seen before. They were told to try their best and to guess if they were 
unsure. The study cards were shuffled before each presentation as before. However, 
the test cards were divided into one of two possible blocked orders: one being the 
reverse of the other. The blocked orders were counterbalanced across participants. 
In each order, every exemplar was separated by a minimum of seven cards from 
another exemplar of the same category and FR level. This was intended to reduce 
the influence that test exemplars might exert on each other because representations of 
ill-defined categories are thought to be dynamic in the sense that they are easily 
modified by relevant experience (Homa, Goldhardt, Burruel-Homa, & Smith, 1993). 
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Table 3.2 Study stimuli for average prototype categories: Insect feature values 
Insect features 
Body 
Neck Nose Wing Sting band Antenna 
Item No.a length length 
.. b posItIOn length width length 
I 5 2 2 5 2 5 
2 2 2 5 5 2 5 
3 5 5 2 2 2 5 
4 2 5 2 5 2 5 
5 2 5 5 2 5 2 
6 2 2 5 5 5 2 
7 5 5 2 2 5 2 
8 5 2 5 2 5 2 
Note. a All items are medium family resemblance exemplars. b As measured from 
the bottom of the neck. 
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Table 3.3 Test Stimuli for Average Prototype Categories: Insect Feature Values 
Item No. 
(Exemplar Type) 
1 (Old Medium FR) 
2 (Old Medium FR) 
3 (Old Medium FR) 
4 (Old Medium FR) 
5 (New Prototype) 
6 (New High FR) 
7 (New High FR) 
8 (New High FR) 
9 (New High FR) 
10 (New Medium FR) 
11 (New Medium FR) 
12 (New Medium FR) 
13 (New Medium FR) 
14 (New Low FR) 
15 (New Low FR) 
16 (New Low FR) 
17 (New Low FR) 
Neck 
length 
5 
5 
2 
2 
3.5 
3 
4 
3 
4 
2 
5 
5 
2 
1 
6 
1 
6 
Insect features 
Nose Wing Sting 
length positiona length 
2 2 5 
5 2 2 
5 5 2 
2 5 5 
3.5 3.5 3.5 
4 3 4 
3 4 3 
3 4 4 
4 3 3 
5 5 2 
2 5 2 
2 2 5 
5 2 5 
6 1 6 
1 6 1 
1 6 6 
6 1 1 
Body 
band Antenna 
width length 
2 5 
2 5 
5 2 
5 2 
3.5 3.5 
3 4 
4 3 
3 4 
4 3 
2 5 
2 5 
5 2 
5 2 
1 6 
6 1 
1 6 
6 1 
Note. FR = Family resemblance. a As measured from the bottom of the neck. 
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Results and Discussion 
The frequency of positive recognition responses, selecting the answer "1 
have seen the picture before", was counted for each subject and exemplar type. The 
proportion of positive recognition responses was then calculated. This represented 
true recognition for the "old" exemplars and incorrect responses (i.e. false alarms) 
for the remainder. The maximum possible number of positive recognition responses 
was 2 for the prototypes and 8 for each of the other exemplar types. (For each 
exemplar type, a chance level response would be 1 and 4 respectively.) The two 
participant groups were very similar in terms of the number of prototypes that they 
recognised. All individuals recognised at least one prototype, with 11 individuals 
from the autism group and 10 from the control group recognising both. An 
independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference between the proportion 
of prototypes selected by the two participant groups: t(28) = .39, p = .70. 
Both participant groups showed the same pattern of results. A higher 
proportion of prototypes and high FR exemplars were identified (incorrectly) as old 
than the actual study item replicas (old medium FR exemplars). There was no 
difference in recognition levels between old and new medium FR items, and the least 
false recognition was received in response to the low FR exemplars. Figure 3.2 
illustrates data from all exemplar types. These comprised five levels: prototype, high 
FR, medium (old) FR, medium (new) FR, and low FR. The presentation order of 
Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 was counterbalanced across participants and included in the 
following analysis: The proportion of positive recognition responses were analysed 
using a 2 (group) x 5 (exemplar type) x 2 (order) mixed, repeated measures ANOYA. 
This revealed a significant main effect of exemplar type: F(4,104) = 52.47, P < .01. 
No other effects or interactions were statistically significant: maximum F(1,26) = 
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1.72, p = 0.201. Repeated contrasts confirmed that high FR exemplars received a 
significantly greater proportion of positive recognition responses than old medium 
FR exemplars, F(1,26) = 10.59,p < .01, and that new medium FR exemplars 
received a significantly greater proportion of positive recognition responses than low 
FR exemplars, F(1,26) = 119.44, p < .01. The contrasts between the remaining 
exemplar types were not significant: prototype and high FR, F(1,26) = 1.63,p = .21, 
also old medium FR and new medium FR, F(1,26) = .15, p = .70. 
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Figure 3.2 Average category: Mean proportion of positive recognition responses 
(PPRR) for each participant group and exemplar type. FR = family resemblance. P 
= prototype, H = high FR exemplars, M = medium FR exemplars, L = low FR 
exemplars, (N) = new exemplars, and (0) = old exemplars. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. PPRR was calculated out of responses to two prototypes 
and to eight each of the remaining exemplar types. 
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The aim of this experiment was to see whether a prototype effect could be 
obtained in the recognition memory of HF A children using an average category 
structure. The full effect was obtained in both the autism and control groups. New 
category prototypes and high FR exemplars received greater levels of recognition 
than exemplars that were actually studied. Furthermore, the two participant groups 
differed neither in overall level of exemplar recognition nor in the degree to which 
similarity to a category prototype affected recognition. In both groups the lower the 
family resemblance of novel exemplars the less false recognition they tended to 
receive. Thus it seems unlikely that individuals in either group responded on the 
basis of how confusable individual features belonging to test items were with 
individual features belonging to study items. If they were doing this, as discussed 
earlier, there would be no prototype effect. The proposals that autism is 
characterised by impairments in prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and 
common feature processing (Plaisted et aI., 1998a) were unsupported by this study. 
No group differences were found in how the correlational structure of stimuli was 
represented in memory. 
Experiment 3.3 
Hayes (1993a; 1993b) used an alternative method for manipulating inter-
exemplar similarity within prototype-based categories. This involved the creation of 
modal prototypes. These possessed the feature types that occurred most frequently in 
the study sets. Such feature types varied in identify, for example, a head feature 
could be square, circular, or a diamond in shape. If there is an abnormality 
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concerning the perception of similarity as implied by the theories concerning 
prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and common feature processing 
(Plaisted et aI., 1998a) then a reduced or absent prototype effect in recognition 
memory should be manifest with the use of modal prototypes. 
Method 
Participants. The same participants from Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 took part. 
Materials. The modal category stimuli consisted of drawings of cartoon animals 
presented on cards as in Experiment 3.2. Two categories were represented by 16 
study items: 8 "animals" and 8 "birds". The stimuli were constructed using similar 
methods to those of Hayes and Taplin (1993b). The exemplars had six features each 
of which could take on one of five possible feature values. For example, the bird 
beaks could take on one of five different shapes. Each study item (medium FR 
exemplar) shared three out of six features with the relevant category prototype. For 
each of the two categories, eight study items were constructed so that all the 
prototype feature values occurred four times in the set. Non-prototype features 
occurred only once. Table 3.4 shows the configuration of the study item feature 
values for the bird category. The animal study items had an identical structure. 
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Table 3.4 Study stimuli for modal prototype categories: Bird feature values 
Bird features 
Head Body 
Item No.a Beak Wing crest Foot Tail marking 
1 1 I 1 2 2 2 
2 2 I 1 I 3 3 
3 3 2 1 I I 4 
4 4 3 2 1 1 1 
5 1 4 1 3 1 5 
6 5 1 3 1 4 1 
7 1 1 4 4 5 1 
8 1 5 5 5 1 1 
Note. a All items are medium family resemblance exemplars. (The prototype feature 
value = 1.) 
There were 34 test items with 17 items from each category. These consisted 
of a prototype and four items each of the following exemplar types: high FR, old 
medium FR, new medium FR, and low FR. For each category, the prototype shared 
five features in common with high FR exemplars, three features in common with 
both the new and old medium FR exemplars, and one feature in common with the 
low FR exemplars. See Table 3.5 for test stimuli feature values for birds. Animal 
test items had an identical structure. See Figure 3.3 for examples of modal category 
test stimuli. 
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Table 3.5 Test stimuli for modal prototype categories: Bird feature values 
Bird features 
Head Body Item No. 
(Exemplar Type) Beak Wing crest Foot Tail marking 
I (Old Medium FR) I 1 1 2 2 2 
2 (Old Medium FR) 4 3 2 1 1 1 
3 (Old Medium FR) 2 I 1 I 3 3 
4 (Old Medium FR) 1 5 5 5 1 1 
5 (New Prototype) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 (New High FR) 1 5 1 1 1 1 
7 (New High FR) 1 1 4 1 1 1 
8 (New High FR) 1 1 1 3 1 1 
9 (New High FR) 1 1 1 1 2 1 
10 (New Medium FR) 3 1 1 2 1 4 
11 (New Medium FR) 1 1 3 3 1 5 
12 (New Medium FR) 5 2 1 1 4 1 
13 (New Medium FR) 1 4 4 1 5 1 
14 (New Low FR) 4 4 1 3 2 5 
15 (New Low FR) 5 3 3 1 4 2 
16 (New Low FR) 2 1 4 4 5 3 
17 (New Low FR) 3 2 2 2 1 4 
Note. FR = Family resemblance. 
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Protototype High FR exemplar 
Medium FR exemplar Low FR exemplar 
Figure 3.3 Examples of modal category test stimuli. All are from the bird category. 
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Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3.2 except that 
children were told to sort the study cards into two piles of birds and animals. All 
participants completed the memory task (Experiment 3.1) and the modal category 
task (Experiment 3.3) within a week. The two category tasks (Experiments 3.2 and 
3.3) were completed on separate days and the presentation order of these two tasks 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
Results and Discussion 
A data-recording problem resulted in data from one matched pair being 
excluded from the analysis, so there were 14 individuals in each participant group. 
Prototype false recognition levels for the two participant groups were similar. All 
control participants recognised at least one prototype and seven recognised both. 
The frequency of participants with autism recognising none, one, and both prototypes 
were 3, 3, and 8 respectively. The proportion of positive recognition responses was 
calculated for each exemplar type as in Experiment 3.2. An independent samples t-
test revealed no significant difference between the proportion of prototypes 
recognised by the two participant groups: t(22) = .54, p = .59 (equal variances not 
assumed). 
F or both participant groups, a higher proportion of prototype and high FR 
exemplars were incorrectly identified as old than the actual replicas of study items. 
There was no difference in recognition levels between both old and new medium FR 
items. Low FR exemplars elicited the least false recognition. Figure 3.4 illustrates 
data from all the exemplar types. The order in which participants completed 
Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 was entered into the following analysis: The proportion of 
positive recognition responses were analysed using a 2 (group) x 5 (exemplar type) x 
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2 (order) mixed, repeated measures ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect 
of exemplar type: Greenhouse-Geisser F(3, 66) = 12.66, p < .01. No other main 
effects or interactions were significant: maximumF(l,24) = 1.24,p = .282. 
Repeated contrasts confinned that high FR exemplars received a significantly greater 
proportion of positive recognition responses than old medium FR exemplars F( 1,24) 
= 10.05,p < .01 and that new medium FR exemplars received a significantly greater 
proportion of positive recognition responses than low FR exemplars F(1,24) = 8.92, 
p < .01. The contrasts between the following exemplar types were not significant: 
prototype and high FR, F(l,24) = .06,p = .81, also old and new medium FR, F(1,24) 
= 1.30, p = .26. 
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Figure 3.4 Modal Category: Mean proportion of positive recognition responses 
(PPRR) for each participant group and exemplar type. FR = family resemblance. P 
= prototype, H = high FR exemplars, M = medium FR exemplars, L = low FR 
exemplars, (N) = new exemplars, and (0) = old exemplars. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. PPRR was calculated out of responses to two prototypes 
and to eight each of the remaining exemplar types. 
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The aim of this experiment was to test the hypothesis that children with 
autism would fail to demonstrate a prototype effect in recognition memory using a 
modal category structure. Such an effect is dependent upon sensitivity to the 
common elements present between stimuli. The fact that the HF A children exhibited 
the effect represents a lack of support for the accounts that suggest impairments in 
prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and in common features processing 
(Plaisted et aI., 1998a). The two groups did not differ in overall recognition levels or 
in the degree to which similarity to the prototype affected recognition. The more 
features that an exemplar shared with the category prototype the greater recognition 
it tended to receive. 
General Discussion 
The hypotheses that children with autism would fail to demonstrate a full 
prototype effect in recognition memory using an average category structure 
(Experiment 3.2) and a modal category structure (Experiment 3.3) were unsupported; 
a full prototype effect was demonstrated in recognition memory in both these 
experiments. The fact that effects were obtained with different stimulus structures 
supports the generality of the findings. Klinger and Dawson (2001) describe what 
can be considered both "strong" and "weak" accounts of category learning in autism. 
The strong version holds that individuals with autism may fail to form prototype 
representations. The present studies limit the generality of this version by 
demonstrating that HF A children can show prototype effects. These results also fail 
to support the weak version of Klinger and Dawson's theory, that prototype 
formation is impaired, as well as failing to provide evidence of a deficit in common 
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feature processing or reduced perception of similarity (Plaisted et al., Submitted; 
Plaisted et al., 1998a). 
Several methodological differences between the studies could account for 
the discrepancies between their results. As mentioned in the introduction both , 
Klinger and Dawson's (2001) and Plaisted et al. 's (Submitted) study tested the 
formation of prototype effects via categorisation responses. In the present studies, 
participants simply had to make a recognition decision by deciding whether or not 
they had seen the stimulus before. Several studies have demonstrated that 
experimental manipulations can differentially affect recognition and categorisation 
performance (Homa et a1., 1993; Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998; 
Palmeri & Flanery, 1999). For example, Knowlton and Squire found that amnesic 
patients demonstrated intact categorisation prototype effects despite impaired 
recognition. So, the possibility remains that prototype effects are also dissociable in 
autism with intact recognition memory and impaired categorisation processes. 
Another possibility is that the LF A children in Klinger and Dawson's study were 
confused by the experimental task. The question that asked them to select the Mip 
from two category members was ambiguous; either choice was "correct" because 
both items were Mips. These children may have been less able to use context to 
guide their answers because of difficulty understanding the pragmatic implications of 
language (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Eales, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 1981). In contrast, the 
question used in the present studies was relatively straightforward with a single 
correct answer: Participants were asked if they had seen the test item before. 
Both clinical groups in Klinger and Dawson's study, neither of which 
showed a prototype effect, had developmental delay. Additionally, their VMA was 
lower on average than that of the HF A group in the present studies. There are two 
62 
ways in which both these factors, developmental delay and low VMA, could affect 
the expression of the prototype effect. They could directly influence the mental 
representations assumed to drive the prototype effect. Alternatively, these two 
factors could exert their influence indirectly by interacting with the demands of the 
experimental tasks involved in producing the effect. Although a direct influence is a 
theoretical possibility, existing evidence suggests that this is unlikely. The fact that a 
prototype effect has been observed in infants (Younger, 1985, 1990) suggests that the 
effect does not follow a developmental trajectory. There is also evidence that mild 
non-organic developmental delay does not affect prototype formation (Hayes & 
Taplin, 1993a). Indeed, the fact that the prototype effect has been demonstrated by 
pigeons (Huber & Lenz, 1996; Jitsumori, 1996) seems to indicate that a fundamental 
learning process is responsible. 
The developmental delay or lower VMA of the participants in Klinger and 
Dawson's (2001) study may have affected aspects of performance indirectly. For 
example, the LF A group may have failed to respond to the prototype because they 
had difficulty retaining visual information. There is evidence that LF A (but not 
HF A) children perform at chance on delayed matching-to-sample visual recognition 
tests (Barth et aI., 1995). The HF A group in the present study appeared not to share 
this difficulty as shown by the presence of prototype effects and high memory task 
scores. 
Also, the findings of the current study appear to contradict Plaisted et aI's 
(Submitted) findings of impaired prototype effects shown by HF A participants. One 
possibility (suggested by Kate Plaisted, personal communication) is that the stimuli 
used in the current study rendered the prototype effect task much easier for the HF A 
participants. This is because verbal labels could be attached the features of the 
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cartoon animals, thus increasing their salience and relevance. The geometric shapes 
used by Plaisted and colleagues could not be labelled so easily in this manner. 
The studies reported here appear to provide examples of intact central 
coherence in autism. Both participant groups responded to the test exemplars as if 
they had integrated visual information from the study phases. The test exemplars 
varied in the level of integration that they represented. For example, average 
medium FR exemplars represented an absence of integration because they possessed 
features that were identical to those of the study sets. The average prototypes 
represented high levels of integration because they possessed features that were the 
category average in size and that had not actually appeared in the study sets. 
Participants' simple binary responses were influenced by the degree of integration 
represented by the test stimuli: the higher the integration, the greater the level of 
positive recognition. These findings stand in contrast to studies that demonstrate a 
reduced ability to integrate information in autism and that refer to this impairment as 
weak central coherence (e.g. Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 2001). 
These studies required participants to produce responses that are more 
complex. For example, the object identification task employed by Jolliffe and 
Baron-Cohen, presented participants with pictures of object fragments. The required 
response was the name of the whole object. The preceding observations imply that: 
Central coherence is intact where individuals with autism make simple judgements 
that reflect the levels of integration already inherent in stimuli; central coherence is 
weak where individuals with autism are required to make a response that is a direct 
integration of stimuli. If this dichotomy is replicable, there are two possibilities. The 
apparent weak central coherence impairment in integration may actually represent a 
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deficit of late processing. Specifically, this deficit would occur at the point where an 
integrated mental representation is translated into a response that reflects that 
integration, for example, the naming of a whole object (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen). 
The other possibility is that this particular type of weak central coherence represents 
a dissociation: implicit (unconscious) processing is intact and explicit (conscious) 
processing is impaired. The participants in Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen's study, for 
example, could not name the objects correctly without some conscious awareness of 
the processes involved in integrating the fragments. However, participants in the 
present studies could make responses that were influenced by the degree of 
integration present in stimuli, without any conscious awareness of this particular 
stimulus property. 
In conclusion, the present studies failed to support predictions of an 
impaired or absent prototype effect in autism. These predictions were derived from 
accounts suggesting impairments in prototype formation (Klinger & Dawson, 2001), 
in common feature processing (Plaisted et al., 1998a), and in central coherence 
(Frith, 1989). The present studies possess several methodological aspects that are 
absent in one or more of the studies that support these accounts. Anyone of these 
aspects may have favoured the expression of prototype effects by children with 
autism. These include: an autism group that is high functioning, cartoon animal 
stimuli, and a requirement for simple binary responses. Also, the task question was 
unambiguous and taxed recognition memory. Further research is required to isolate 
and test these methodological differences to see which ones critically affect the 
performance of individuals with autism. 
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Footnotes 
1 The design of Experiment 3.2 (average categories) permitted calculation 
of A' (an estimate of memory sensitivity free from response criteria) for medium FR 
exemplar items only. Hit rates (proportion of correct responses to old items) and 
false alarm rates (proportion of incorrect responses to new items) were combined to 
produce A' scores for each participant (Rae, 1976). The autism group appeared to 
have reduced memory sensitivity (M= .67, SD = .21) compared to the control group 
(M = .80, SD = .10). This was confirmed by an independent samples t-test, t(20) = 
2.30, p = .03 (equal variances not assumed). 
2 A' scores were calculated for modal category medium FR exemplars also. 
There appeared to be no difference in memory sensitivity (autism group: M = .50, SD 
= .25, control group: M = .53, SD = .24). This was supported by an independent 
samples t-test, t(26) = .24,p = .81. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Prototype effects in autism: recognition and categorisation 
compared 
Background: The aim of the current study was to test the suggestion made 
in Chapter 3 that individuals with autism would show intact prototype effects in 
recognition memory (as reported in Experiments 3.2 and 3.3) but impaired prototype 
effects in categorisation responses (as reported by Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Plaisted 
et al., Submitted). Method: Prototype effects were assessed in 18 HF A children and 
18 controls matched on CA and VMA. This was done by obtaining recognition and 
categorisation responses to new (unstudied) and old (previously studied) dot pattern 
exemplars created using statistical distortion rules outlined in Posner, Goldsmith, and 
Welton (1967). Additionally, the effect of varying learning trials (one vs. six) was 
examined. Results: No participant group differences were observed in responses to 
new items. Both participants groups demonstrated some evidence of prototype 
effects in recognition and categorisation tasks. The HF A group performed 
significantly less well than controls on the recognition of old stimuli after one 
learning trial. After six learning trials, performance matched that of the control 
group. Conclusions: There was no evidence of a dissociation between recognition 
and categorisation performance in autism. Following Ameli, Courchesne, Lincoln, 
Kaufman, et al. (1988) the impairment in recognition memory for old items was 
interpreted as difficulty encoding meaningless stimuli. 
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Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrated that HFA children do show prototype 
effects in recognition memory with both average prototypes and modal prototypes. 
These findings appear to be inconsistent with studies showing that LF A children 
(Klinger & Dawson, 2001) and HF A adults and adolescents (Plaisted et al., 
Submitted) fail to abstract prototypes. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a key methodological difference between the 
experiments reporting intact and impaired effects is the nature of the task used to 
assess category learning. Where no prototype effect was obtained, the task was one 
of categorisation. In Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 where HF A children exhibited full 
prototype effects, the task was one of simple recognition: Participants had to indicate 
whether or not they had seen each test item previously. The possibility remains 
therefore that individuals with autism exhibit a dissociation: being able to show a 
prototype effect in recognition memory but not via categorisation responses. This 
possibility is consistent with either one of two states for categorisation responses. A 
general difficulty with transfer performance to new category members would result 
in a reduced prototype effect because performance on all exemplars would tend 
towards chance levels of responding. This would mean that a category prototype 
would lose much of its advantage over other exemplar types. Alternatively, even if 
transfer performance is unaffected, a specific difficulty with prototype abstraction via 
categorisation should also result in a reduced or absent prototype effect (prototype 
abstraction is considered a prerequisite for the demonstration of such an effect). 
In support of the plausibility of the former notion, there is considerable evidence 
that recognition and categorisation processes in general are separable. For example, 
a double dissociation has been reported in the neuropsychological literature. 
Knowlton and Squire (1993) and Squire and Knowlton (1995) found that patients 
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with amnesia show impaired recognition performance but intact categorisation where 
they exhibited an identical prototype effect to a control group. Knowlton, Mangels, 
and Squire (1996) tested patients with Parkinson's disease who showed the reverse 
dissociation to the amnesic patients. Whilst their recognition performance matched 
levels of the control group, their early classification learning was inferior to that of 
both the amnesic and normal control group. (Later classification learning eventually 
reached the level of the amnesic group.) Also, Palmeri and Flanery (1999) obtained 
a dissociation between recognition and classification performance by inducing 
"amnesia" in normal participants. They achieved this by leading participants to 
believe that they had received a subliminal presentation of dot patterns, when in fact 
there was none, before the test phase. Unsurprisingly, participants made recognition 
judgements that were at chance levels of performance. However, their classification 
performance revealed a prototype effect and was at a level similar to that of the 
controls and amnesic patients reported by Knowlton and Squire (1993) and Squire 
and Knowlton (1995). 
None of these neuropsychological studies, whether real or simulated, 
examined prototype effects in recognition memory, they only tended to examine 
those in categorisation. There is evidence, however, that recognition and 
categorisation prototype effects are experimentally separable. Metcalfe and Fisher 
(1986) obtained both recognition and classification judgements on dot patterns. 
They manipulated participants' expectations concerning the nature of the 
experimental task. Expectation of a classification task enhanced classification 
performance and increased size of the prototype effect. In contrast, expectation of a 
recognition task failed to enhance recognition prototype effects. 
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The dissociation observed in amnesia has triggered ongoing debate as to 
whether or not recognition and categorisation processes are subserved by one or two 
memory systems. Knowlton and Squire used the dissociations observed in amnesia 
and Parkinson's disease to argue for the case that recognition and categorisation 
processes are achieved by separate memory systems (Knowlton et aI., 1996; 
Knowlton & Squire, 1993; Squire & Knowlton, 1995). 
Palmeri and Flanery (1999) argued, however, that at least one part of the 
double dissociation, that showed by amnesic patients, did not necessarily imply 
separate memory systems. They pointed out that their study, where prototype effects 
in categorisation were obtained without a study phase, demonstrated that prior 
learning and hence use of a special memory system, were unnecessary for 
categorisation. Instead, they suggested that an intact working memory was all that 
was needed for successful categorisation performance. 
Nosofsky and Zaki (1998) described how a single-system exemplar model 
could also account for the amnesic dissociation. They suggested that patients with 
amnesia suffered a general reduction in memory sensitivity (the ability to 
discriminate between individual exemplars). This abnormality would deteriorate 
recognition performance. However, such reduced memory sensitivity need not 
impair categorisation performance on Knowlton and Squire's task, because 
participants were identifying a single category from a collection of random lures. 
This means that all that was required was to detect broad similarities between an item 
and the category, a capability generally intact in amnesia, without the need for fine-
grained discrimination. In support of this argument Nosofsky and Zaki reduced 
memory sensitivity in controls by introducing a one-week delay between training and 
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testing. Results were comparable to those shown by amnesic patients with intact 
categorisation performance and considerable impairment in recognition accuracy. 
The issue of whether one or more memory systems subserve recognition and 
categorisation prototype effects is not addressed directly here. Instead, this study is 
designed to test the notion that individuals with autism behave like patients with 
Parkinson's disease: that is able to show prototype effects in recognition memory, 
but not via categorisation. If such a dissociation is found a multi-system account 
could explain these findings in a straightforward fashion (i.e. by positing impairment 
in some aspect of the categorisation system). The onus would then be on single 
system theorists to demonstrate how such a model could also account for the 
dissociation. 
Given the parallels that have been drawn between the memory profiles 
observed in autism and amnesia, this prediction of a reverse performance profile to 
amnesia would perhaps be surprising from a traditional viewpoint. Initially, both 
behavioural and neuropsychological evidence gave rise to the view that the two 
disorders were analogous. Medial temporal lobe amnesia is characterised by 
particular difficulty with recall and "yes/no" recognition after filled delays between 
study and testing whereas cued recall remained intact (Baddeley & Warrington, 
1970; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970, 1974). Boucher and Warrington (1976) 
reported a similar memory profile in autism: LF A participants showed impaired 
recognition and recall after filled delays. Also, post-mortem studies of individuals 
with autism found abnormalities in the medial temporal region containing the 
hippocampal formation and associated structures (e.g. Bauman & Kemper, 1985). 
LFA in particular has been associated with extensive medial temporal lobe 
abnormalities (Delong & Heinz, 1997). 
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Later studies, however, have cast doubt on the applicability of this analogue 
to RF A individuals. Minshew and Goldstein (1993) and Bennetto, Pennington, and 
Rogers (1996) found that RF A performance on the recognition and free recall 
elements of the California Verbal Learning Test matched that of control groups. 
Likewise, neuroanatomical evidence does not support the comparison between the 
disorders. For example, hippocampal abnormalities have not been found to be 
universally present at autopsy (Bailey et aI., 1998). 
The following experiment was designed to compare recognition-based and 
categorisation-based prototype effects within the same group of participants. The 
paradigm and methods of stimuli construction were the same as those used by 
Knowlton and Squire (1993). The paradigm was further adapted by comparing the 
effect of manipulating the number of learning trials (one vs. six) on test responses as 
done by Roma, Goldhardt, Burruel-Roma, and Smith (1993). The purpose was to 
facilitate the production of prototype effects. Roma et aI. observed that prototype 
effects were greater in recognition memory after one trial but the greatest in 
categorisation after several trials. 
If there is a dissociation between prototype effects in recognition and 
categorisation then the autism group should show intact prototype effects in the 
recognition conditions and impaired prototype effects in the categorisation conditions 
relative to controls. Furthermore, the differences between participant groups should 
be most pronounced after six trials in the categorisation test (and if participant group 
differences were to be found in recognition memory, they should be most 
pronounced after one learning trial). A further advantage of comparing responses 
examining the effect of learning is that this may provide further information about 
the nature of any deficits that may be observed. Of particular interest is whether or 
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not such deficits become attenuated with increased learning as was the case with the 
categorisation performance of patients with Parkinson's disease (Knowlton et aI., 
1996). 
Experiment 4.1 
Method 
Participants 
Eighteen HF A children and 18 typically developing children completed the 
study. Participants groups were matched globally on CA and VMA. Children in the 
autism group had been diagnosed by clinicians as having either AS (14) or autism (4) 
according to standard specifications such as those listed in the DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). They were recruited from special education facilities 
and ranged in chronological age from 10 years of age to 16 years and 6 months. 
Children in the control group were recruited from schools in South East England. 
Their ages ranged from 10 years and 4 months to 16 years and 4 months. VMA was 
assessed by the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (L. M. Dunn et aI., 1997). 
Nonverbal mental age was assessed using Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
1996). Table 1 summarises participant details. 
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Table 4.1 Participant characteristics 
Autism Group Control Group 
(n = 18) (n = 18) 
Chronological age (years) 
M(SD) 13.00 (1.84) 12.84 (1.66) 
VMA (years) 
M(SD) 13.60 (2.20) 13.21 (2.39) 
Range 9.58 - 17.00 9.58 - 16.83 
BPVS raw scores 
M(SD) 120.56 (14.56) 117.5 (14.62) 
Range 94 - 152 94 - 139 
RPM raw scores 
M(SD) 39.56 (10.08) 43.44 (6.46) 
Range 23 - 53 31 - 57 
Note. VMA = verbal mental age. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale. VMA 
was derived from the BPVS raw scores. RPM = Ravens Progressive Matrices. 
Maximum group difference: t(29) = 1.38,p =.18 (equal variances not assumed). 
Apparatus and stimuli 
All stimuli appeared in black as lines or solid shapes against a white 
background and unless mentioned otherwise, all stimuli were presented on a Toshiba 
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Satellite laptop computer with a screen measuring 286mm x 214mm. Foam pads 
attached to the A and L keys formed response buttons. 
Experimental stimuli. Four dot patterns were created: each by randomly placing nine 
black dots (of Imm diameter) on a hypothetical square grid. These were denoted the 
prototypes of categories A to D. From each prototype the statistical distortion rules 
of Posner, Goldsmith, and Welton (1967) were used to create study and test items. 
The study items comprised six medium FR items. Four of these were also presented 
as test items in addition to four each of medium FR, high FR, and low FR items. The 
distortion level, as defined by Posner et aI., for each exemplar type was as follows: 
high FR - 3 Bits/Dot, medium FR - 5 Bits/Dot, low FR - 7.7, Bits / Dot. The dot 
patterns occupied a maximum computer screen area of 5 x 5 cm. See Figure 4.1 for 
examples of study and test stimuli. 
The selection of exemplar types was the same as those used in Knowlton 
and Squire's (1993) study with one exception. Old medium FR exemplar types were 
included in the test phase following Experiments 3.2 and 3.3 and Homa et aI. (1993). 
Old medium FR exemplar types were included to provide a more complete picture of 
recognition memory. The actual prototypes were excluded because responses to 
prototypes are unnecessary to demonstrate a prototype effect. Instead, what is 
necessary is that similarity to the prototype determines categorisation or recognition 
responses (as discussed in Chapters 2 & 3). 
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Figure 4.1. Examples of study stimuli (top row) and test stimuli (bottom row). Top 
row, from left to right (all medium FR exemplars): one each from categories A-D. 
Bottom row, from left to right (all new from category A): high FR exemplar, medium 
FR exemplar, and low FR exemplar. 
Practice stimuli. These included eight circles and eight squares. Six stimuli of each 
shape were white with black borders and occupied screen areas ranging from 5 x 5 
mm to 18 x 18 mm. Additionally, the smallest and largest of each shape were 
replicated and presented as solid black shapes. 
As a visual aid for instructing participants, each screen event from the 
practice sessions, study and test phases, was printed on separate sheets of paper. 
Additionally, two further random dot patterns were generated and denoted Prototypes 
E and F. From each of these, four medium FR exemplars (5 Bits/ Dot) each were 
generated and printed out. 
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Procedure 
Each participant completed the one-trial condition and the six-trial 
condition on separate days. No more than two weeks passed between these test 
sessions. Each condition comprised a study phase and a test phase. Before each 
phase, participants received instructions and completed a practice session designed to 
familiarise them or remind them of tasks involved in the main experimental sessions. 
All phases of each condition were completed one immediately following the other in 
the order presented here. 
Practice study session: This familiarised participants with the process of 
categorising stimuli using feedback from the computer. Eight white practice stimuli, 
four from each category and each of these taking one of four different sizes, were 
presented in sequence. Participants learnt to categorise the shapes, each flanked by 
two labels that denoted the available categories (X for squares, and Y for circles), by 
pressing the response button located on the same side as the relevant label. Learning 
was achieved by means of feedback from the computer. After each response, the 
correct category label remained on screen together with the stimulus until the 
participant pressed a key to proceed. Wrong answers only were marked by a beep. 
See Figure 4.2 for a diagram of screen events and their duration. A randomly 
varying presentation time was selected for the fixation point that preceded each 
stimulus to discourage participants from settling into a mode of automatic 
responding. Participants were instructed how to complete the practice session with 
the aid of the pictures of screen events. They were told to start looking at the 
fixation point until the first stimulus arrived. For the first four responses, they were 
given verbal reinforcements to corroborate the computer feedback. A message 
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appeared at the completion of each study session stating the number of correct 
responses. 
* Delay (300ms) 
Fixation (1000-2000ms) 
Feedback (1200ms) 
Categorisation (Subject-specific duration) 
Figure 4.2. Diagram of screen events during study phase. Fixation duration varied 
randomly within range. (The stimuli and labels depicted are those shown in the 
experimental study phase). 
Experimental study session. Immediately preceding this session, participants were 
told that they would be completing another game very similar to the shape sorting 
game (practice study session) in that they had to sort pictures into two groups. They 
were shown pictures of the dot patterns belonging to the E and F categories and 
shown how all E dot patterns looked a bit similar to each other and similarly the F 
dot patterns. They were told that in the new game, they would be sorting some 
different dot patterns. 
Participants then commenced the study session. The procession of screen 
events was identical to that illustrated in Figure 4.2. Participants were presented with 
12 medium FR exemplars, 6 each from categories A and B, or categories C and Din 
random order. Category type was counterbalanced across conditions (one-trial vs. 
six-trial). As in the practice study session, each stimulus was flanked by two 
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category labels. The experimental task involved learning to categorise the dot 
pattern into an appropriate category and feedback was provided by the computer. In 
the one-trial condition, participants had the chance to categorise each exemplar once. 
In the six-trial condition, participants cycled through all twelve exemplars six times. 
In both conditions, each cycle of exemplars was presented in a different random 
order. No message appeared stating the number of correct responses. 
Practice test session. This was identical for both one trial and six-trial conditions. 
The aim of this task was to teach participants how to indicate recognition and 
categorisation responses. Eight stimuli, comprising the largest and smallest of each 
category presented in the practice study phase together with their replicas coloured 
black, were presented sequentially in random order. Following presentation of the 
fixation point, the stimulus appeared flanked by two recognition response labels: 
"Have seen" and "Not seen". Ifparticipants decided that they had seen the stimulus 
before in the study session, they were asked to select the "Have seen" label by 
pressing the relevant response button. Conversely, if the stimulus was viewed as 
new they selected the "Not seen" label. After participants had made a recognition 
response, the stimulus remained on screen whilst the labels changed to the 
categorisation response options: X and Y. Participants indicated their responses as 
they had in the practice study session. The position of the "Seen / Not seen" labels 
and category labels was counterbalanced across categories and conditions. No 
feedback was provided throughout the test phase. See Figure 4.3 for a diagram of 
screen events and durations for the test phase. Instructions were provided before the 
test phases by showing participants pictures of each screen event they would 
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encounter. At completion, the sum of correct recognition and categorisation 
responses was displayed. 
* Delay (300ms) 
Fixation (1000-2000ms) 
Categorisation (Subject-specific duration) 
Delay (300ms) 
Recognition (Subject-specific duration) 
Figure 4.3. Diagram of screen events during the test phase. Fixation duration varied 
randomly within range. (The stimuli and labels depicted are from the experimental 
test phase.) 
Experimental test phase: Following the practice test phase, participants were told 
they would be doing another game, just like the test practice session, but instead of 
shapes they would be making recognition and categorisation judgements to dot 
patterns. During this task, participants were presented with exemplars from two 
categories (either A and B, or C and D) that they had just studied. They were 
presented with four items of high FR exemplars, old medium FR exemplars, new 
medium FR exemplars, and low FR exemplars from each category. These were 
presented sequentially in a different random order for each participant and condition. 
The screen events and the responses required by each participant were identical to 
those of the practice study phase. At completion, the sum of correct recognition and 
categorisation responses was displayed. 
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Results 
Study phases 
The number of correct categorisation responses made by each participant 
was counted for each trial of the one-trial condition and of the six-trial condition 
(max. score for each trial = 12). These figures were converted to proportions to form 
the proportion of correct categorisation responses. Figure 4.4 illustrates the mean 
proportion of correct categorisation responses from both conditions 
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Figure 4.4. Study phases: Mean proportion of correct categorisation responses 
(PCCR) for each condition. Tl = one-trial condition. T6 = six-trial condition. Trial 
number is given in parentheses. Error bars represent SEM. 
As can be seen from the graph, both participant groups performed similarly 
in both conditions. In addition, both participant groups in the six-trial condition 
showed a marked learning effect with categorisation performance improving over 
learning trials. These observations were confirmed by analysis. The order in which 
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participants completed the experimental conditions was entered in a 2 (order) x 2 
(group) ANOV A analysis of proportion of correct categorisation responses for the 
one-trial condition. This revealed no significant effects: maximum F(1 ,32) < 1. A 2 
(order) x 2 (group) x 6 (trial number) mixed, repeated measures ANOV A analysis of 
proportion of correct categorisation responses for the six-trial condition revealed a 
significant main effect of trial number: Greenhouse-Geisser F(3, 92) = 16.74, p < 
.001. The other significant main effect was that of order: F(I,32) = 4.99, p = .03. See 
Order effects section for further details. No other main effects or interactions were 
significant: maximum: F(3, 92) <1. 
Test phases 
Knowlton and Squire (1993) tested categorisation on new items only so for 
comparability old and new FR items were analysed separately. 
Test phase - recognition - new exemplars. The number of positive recognition 
responses (i.e. selections of the "Have seen" label) made by each participant was 
counted for each exemplar type and condition (one-trial vs. six-trial). The maximum 
possible score was 8 and these figures were converted into proportions to form the 
proportion of positive recognition responses. 
Data for both old and new items are illustrated in Figure 4.5. As can be 
seen from the graph, the responses to new items were very similar for both 
participant groups. Each group showed a partial prototype effect in both conditions 
in that low FR exemplars received less recognition than medium FR exemplars. 
High FR items were recognised at equal or slightly higher levels than the medium FR 
items. These observations were confirmed by a 2 (order) x 2 (group) x 2 (conditions) 
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x 3 (exemplar type) mixed, repeated measures ANOVA. (Conditions comprised one-
trial vs. six-trial and exemplar type refers to FR level: high, medium and low.) This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of exemplar type: F(2,64) = 27.64, p < 
.001. Repeated contrasts revealed a significant difference between medium and low 
FR exemplars, F(I,32) = 42.74,p < .001, but none between high FR and medium FR 
exemplars, F(1,32) = 1.45,p = .24. There was also a significant interaction of 
exemplar type by order: F(2,64) = 5.15,p = .008. See Order effects section for 
further details. No other effects or interactions were statistically significant: 
maximum: F(1,32) = 2.88, p = .10. 
Thus, the earlier prediction of no participant group differences in 
recognition memory prototype effects was supported. (Although, the findings 
provided no support for the proposition stated earlier that recognition prototype 
effects may be more pronounced after one learning trial than six learning trials.) 
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Figure 4.5. Test phases: Mean proportion of positive recognition responses (PPRR) 
for each condition and exemplar type. TI = one-trial condition. T6 = six-trial 
condition. H = high FR exemplars, M = medium FR exemplars, L = low FR 
exemplars. (N) = new exemplars, and (0) = old exemplars. Error bars represent 
SEM. 
Test phase - recognition - old exemplars. Inspection of Figure 4.5 would suggest 
that the autism group showed less recognition to old medium FR exemplar types than 
controls in the one-trial condition, but this recognition performance matched that of 
controls after six learning trials. This observation was borne out by analysis with a 2 
(group) x 2 (order) x 2 (condition) mixed, repeated measures ANOVA. This showed 
a main effect of condition: F(1,32) = 4.81, p = .04 and a significant interaction of 
group by condition F(1,32) = 4.81, p = .04. 
Following Howell (1997, pp. 412 - 415), simple effects analysis with Feri! 
(1,32) ｾ］＠ 4.17, and alpha = .05, revealed significant participant group differences in 
responses to the one-trial condition: Fobs (1,32) = 4.40. Group differences in the six-
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trial condition were not significant: Fobs (1,32) < 1. The other effects of the main 
analysis were not significant: maximum F(1 ,32) = 2.41, p = .13 1• 
The group differences obtained here contrast with evidence discussed in this 
chapter and Chapter 3 suggesting that visual recognition memory is intact in HF A 
children. 
Test phase - categorisation - new exemplars. The number of correct categorisation 
responses made by each participant was counted for each exemplar type and 
condition (one-trial or six-trial). As with the recognition responses, the maximum 
possible score for each exemplar type was 8. As in the study phase, these figures 
were converted into proportions. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates categorisation responses during the test phase. As can 
be seen from the graph, the transfer performance of both participant groups improved 
from the one-trial condition to the six-trial condition. In general, both participant 
groups showed partial prototype effects. Medium FR items were classified with 
greater accuracy than low FR items and this difference was increased after six 
learning trials. 
The proportion of correct categorisation responses for new items were 
analysed with a 2 (order) x 2 (group) x 2 (condition) x 3 (exemplar type) mixed, 
repeated measures ANOVA. (Conditions comprised one-trial vs. six-trial and 
exemplar type refers to FR level: high, medium, and low.) There was a significant 
main effect of condition: F(1,32) = 14.19,p = .001. There was also a significant 
main effect of exemplar type: F(2,64) = 9.71,p < .001. Repeated contrasts revealed 
a significant difference between medium and low FR exemplars: F(1,32) = 6.41,p = 
.02 but not between high and medium FR exemplars: F(1,32) = 3.24,p = .08. The 
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interaction between condition and exemplar type showed a trend towards 
significance: Greenhouse-Geisser F(2,50) = 3.29, p = .06. There was a significant 
interaction between order and exemplar type: F(2, 64) = 4.45, p = .02. See Order 
effects section for further details. No other effects were significant: maximum 
Greenhouse-Geisser F(2,50) = 2.23, p = .13. 
Thus, the findings failed to support the prediction made earlier of a 
participant group difference in prototype effects in categorisation. (There was mild 
support for the idea that categorisation prototype effects might be more pronounced 
after six learning trials.) 
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Figure 4.6. Test phases: Mean proportion of correct categorisation responses 
(PCCR) for each condition and exemplar type. Tl = one-trial condition. T6 = six-
trial condition. H = high FR exemplars, M = medium FR exemplars, L = low FR 
exemplars. (N) = new exemplars, and (0) = old exemplars. Error bars represent 
SEM. 
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Test phase - categorisation - old exemplars. As Figure 4.6 shows both participant 
groups were better at categorising old items after six learning trials than one, and 
both participants groups behaved similarly. This was supported by the results of a 2 
(order) by 2 (condition) by 2 (group) mixed, repeated measures ANOV A. This 
revealed a main effect of condition: F(1,32) = 7.98,p = .008. The main effect of 
order was also significant: F(1,32) = 4.46,p = .04. See Order effects section for 
further details. Neither the main effect of group or any other interactions were 
significant: all F(1 ,32) < l. 
Order effects 
With the exception of recognition responses to old exemplars, all 
categorisation and recognition responses from the current study involved order 
effects. These all tended to form a consistent pattern. During the study phase of the 
six-trial condition, participants who completed this condition first tended to perform 
rather better during this condition than those who completed the six-trial condition 
last. 
Although the test phase findings represented the combination of one-trial 
and six-trial data, these results are likely to be heavily biased by the six-trial 
condition because of the greater learning afforded during this condition. It seems 
likely therefore that the superior learning that occurred when the six-trial condition 
was presented first was reflected in the test phases. This was shown by lower false 
recognition for low FR items, and more accurate categorisation of medium FR 
exemplars. 
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Study phase. In general, perfonnance on the six-trial condition was better when 
presented first (est. MM = .81, SEM = .04) than when this condition was presented 
last (est. MM= .68, SEM = .04). 
Test phase - recognition - new exemplars. Analysis with repeated contrasts revealed 
a significant interaction involving medium FR and low FR items, and order: F(l,32) 
= 12.91,p = .001. Low FR items received less recognition when the six-trial 
condition was presented first (est. MM = .26, SEM = .04) than when the six-trial 
condition was presented last (est. MM = .41, SEM= .04). There was little difference 
in medium FR recognition between orders: six-trial condition first (est. MM = .52, 
SEM = .03); six-trial condition last (est. MM = .48, SEM = .03). The interaction 
involving medium FR and high FR items, and order was not significant. 
Test phase - categorisation - new exemplars. Analysis with repeated contrasts 
revealed an interaction involving medium FR and low FR, and order: F(l,32) = 7.12, 
P = .01. Medium FR items received more correct categorisation when the six-trial 
condition was taken first (est. MM= .75, SEM= .04) than when the six-trial 
condition was taken last (est. MM = .61, SEM = .04). There was little difference in 
low FR categorisation perfonnance between orders (six-trial condition first - est. MM 
= .60, SEM= .03 vs. six-trial condition last - est. MM= .61, SEM= 0.04). The 
interaction involving medium FR and high FR items, and order was not significant. 
Test phase - categorisation - old exemplars. In general, categorisation was better 
when the six-trial condition was completed first (est. MM = .78, SEM = .04) than 
when the six-trial condition was completed last (est. MM = .65, SEM = .05). 
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Discussion 
The main aim of the current study was to see whether or not individuals 
with autism exhibited a dissociation between recognition and categorisation 
performance analogous to that shown by patients with Parkinson's disease: showing 
prototype effects in recognition memory but not via categorisation responses. 
Another aim was assess learning in autism over multiple learning trials. 
Analysis of responses to new exemplars failed to support an analogy 
between HF A and Parkinson's disease. The prediction of a dissociation was 
unsupported. No participant group differences were observed with either the 
recognition or the categorisation responses. The findings provide some support for 
the idea that HF A children can show prototype effects in both recognition and 
categorisation responses. Both participant groups tended to obtain higher recognition 
and categorisation scores in response to medium FR exemplars than to low FR 
exemplars. However, such prototype effects were only partial in that no significant 
differences were observed between responses to high FR and medium FR exemplars 
in either participant group. As similarity is assumed to determine responses (whether 
recognition or categorisation) it is possible that the distortion level selected for the 
high FR exemplars was insufficiently similar to the prototype and too similar to 
medium FR exemplars, therefore promoting responses to high FR items that are 
indistinguishable from those to medium FR items. 
In general, both participant groups were affected by multiple learning trials 
in the same way, with the exception of recognition responses to old medium FR 
items. HF A participants showed reduced recognition of old items after one learning 
trial but recognition levels reached levels similar to that of the control group after six 
learning trials. Although this is a form of recognition impairment and categorisation 
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performance on the same stimuli matched that of controls, the overall pattern of 
findings do not fit those observed in amnesia. (A disorder characterised earlier by 
impaired recognition and intact categorisation performance.) Impaired recognition 
performance was displayed by amnesic patients after multiple learning trials (e.g. 
five items presented eight times, Knowlton & Squire, 1993). This contrasts with the 
fact that intact recognition performance of the old items was shown by the HF A 
group reported here, after multiple learning trials (twelve items presented six times). 
Furthermore, neither of the accounts of the amnesic dissociation can explain 
the discrepancy between responses to old and new exemplars observed in the current 
study. Knowlton and Squire's (1993) account of separate memory systems for 
recognition and categorisation and impairment in the recognition sub-system does 
not make a distinction between recognition for old and new items. In addition, 
Palmeri and Flanery (1999) demonstrated directly that reduced memory sensitivity 
would result in equal impairments across old and new items so this explanation can 
not account for the pattern of impairments observed in the current study either. 
Although a number of studies, as discussed earlier, have demonstrated intact 
recognition performance in HF A children, these studies all tested recognition of 
meaningful stimuli. At least one other study has reported recognition impairments 
for meaningless stimuli that may be similar to those reported here. Ameli et al. 
(1988) directly compared visual recognition performance on meaningful stimuli 
(pictures of illustrated concrete nouns e.g. glove, flower) and meaningless stimuli 
(abstract patterns created with lines, curves and geometric shapes). They tested HF A 
adults and adolescents using a non-matching to sample method. This involved 
presenting a series of trials each comprising two presentations. The first presentation 
displayed 5-7 stimulus items and the second displayed the same items plus an 
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addition. The task aim was to identify the addition. Individuals with autism showed 
recognition impairments on the meaningless stimuli but not the meaningful stimuli. 
Ameli et aI. argued that flexible encoding, organisation of information was necessary 
for successful memory performance on meaningless materials, and it was this that 
individuals with autism found difficult. 
This account is consistent with the findings reported here for old exemplars. 
This is because the dot patterns are also meaningless stimuli, and a decrement in 
recognition performance was observed after a single presentation as was the case in 
Ameli et al.'s (1988) study. One difference between the studies, however, is that the 
design of Ameli et al. 's study does not permit distinction between the recognition of 
old and new items. The findings, however, are congruent with a decrement in the 
recognition of old items: Participants may have failed to select the new addition 
because of difficulty recognising the other items in the display as old. 
Despite the transient difficulty with meaningless old stimuli, the display of 
prototype effects with the new stimuli suggested that there was no evidence to 
support Kate Plaisted's suggestion (Chapter 3) that individuals with autism might 
need stimuli to which verbal labels could be attached before displaying prototype 
effects. It seems likely that the dot patterns are as resistant to verbal labels as the 
stimuli used in Plaisted et aI., (Submitted). 
The order in which the one-trial and six-trial condition were presented had a 
marked effect on participant responses. As argued in the Results section, it seems 
likely that order effects observed in the test phase could be attributable to those that 
were observed in the study phase. The fact that performance was worse during the 
study phase of the six-trial condition when this condition was preceded by the very 
similar one-trial condition implied that practice effects were not responsible. 
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Therefore, it seems likely that the training procedures employed in the study were 
effective in teaching participants how to complete the study successfully. Instead, 
these order effects perhaps reflect some heterogeneity in category learning amongst 
both participant groups. 
In sum, no evidence was found to support the notion that conceptual deficits 
in autism can be characterised by a dissociation analogous to Parkinson's disease, 
with impaired prototype effects in categorisation and intact prototype effects in 
recognition. Partial prototype effects were found in recognition and categorisation 
alike in both participant groups. 
Participant group differences were observed in the recognition responses to 
old items. The HF A group was less likely to correctly identify old exemplars as such 
after one learning trial than controls. After six learning trials, recognition 
performance on these items matched that of controls. Following Ameli et al. (1988) 
these results were interpreted as a difficulty encoding meaningless stimuli with the 
proviso that any decrement to recognition is transient and limited to old items. 
No evidence has been found to support either Klinger and Dawson's 
suggestion of a dissociation between rule-based and prototype-based categorisation 
(Chapter 3) nor for the dissociation between recognition and categorisation. Thus, 
the best method of characterising conceptual deficits in autism remains an open 
question. 
One methodological feature of Klinger and Dawson's study raised in 
Chapter 3, was that the question wording may have been ambiguous and thus 
specifically problematic for the group with autism. This question is addressed in the 
studies reported in the following chapter. 
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Footnote 
1 As for Experiments 3.2 and 3.3, A' scores were calculated for recognition 
responses to medium FR exemplars. The autism group showed reduced memory 
sensitivity (A' scores) compared to controls after one trial (Autism: M = .46, SD=.20; 
Control: M=.64, SD = .26). However performance matched that of controls after six 
trials (Autism: M = .71, SD = .21; Control: M = .62, SD = .27). 
When these scores were analysed with a 2 (group) x 2 (order) x 2 
(condition) mixed, repeated measures ANOV A, the general pattern of findings 
mirrored those reported for recognition responses to old medium FR exemplars. The 
main effect of condition showed a trend towards significance, F( 1,32) = 3.94, p = 
.06, and the interaction of group by condition was significant: F(1,32) = 4.84, p = 
.04. An analysis of simple effects with Fcrit (1,32) ｾ］＠ 4.17, and alpha = .05, revealed 
significant participant group differences in responses to the one-trial condition: Fobs 
(1,32) = 4.50 but not the six-trial condition: Fobs (1,32) = 1.07. The other effects and 
interactions of the main analysis were not significant: maximum F(1, 32) = 1.74,p = 
.2. 
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CHAPTER 5 - When prototypes are not best and category membership is 
restricted: Judgements made by children with autism. 
Background: Klinger and Dawson (2001) reported that children with 
autism were unable to abstract prototype representations. In contrast, we found that 
they could (Chapter 3). The current study was designed to test whether children with 
autism had difficulty with the requirement, present in the former study, to select the 
best category member, rather than with prototype formation per se. Method: 
Children with HF A or AS (n = 18) and typically developing children (n = 18) 
completed a prototype effect test by selecting the best examples of categories 
(Experiment 5.1). A control task followed (Experiment 5.2) designed to test 
understanding of the prototype effect test. This task required the selection of the best 
example of a target category from an array. Participants then indicated that their 
selection was not the only possible choice on the control task by indicating the 
number of items belonging to the target category (Experiment 5.3). Results: Most 
participants with autism displayed prototype effects via selection of best category 
members (Experiment 5.1). Furthermore, an association was observed between 
performances on the control task and the prototype effect test (Experiment 5.2). In 
general, participants indicated that the item selected as best was not the only category 
member in this control task and individuals with autism made more conservative 
category membership decisions (Experiment 5.3). Conclusions: The findings 
suggest that children with autism can abstract prototypes and there was evidence of 
difficulty with the requirement to select the best category member. The implications 
of the conservative category membership decisions for broader theoretical accounts 
of autism and concept formation are discussed. 
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Chapter 2 described how Klinger and Dawson (1995, 2001) suggested that 
individuals with autism behave in the manner predicted by the classical model of 
concepts. That is they tend to rely solely upon rule-based categorisation owing to 
difficulty abstracting prototypes. Chapter 3 outlined some of the conflicting 
evidence on this issue. Klinger and Dawson (2001), for example, familiarised LF A 
participants with particular named categories (e.g. Mip). Then, during the test phase 
participants were presented with a binary forced-choice between two previously 
unseen category exemplars. Both of these ostensibly were from the same category. 
One member of the pair was the category prototype, the other possessed features that 
had been seen during the familiarisation phase but the combination of features in that 
particular animal was novel. Participants were asked to identify the Mip (for 
example). If any pointed out, correctly, that both items were Mips they were 
instructed to select the best one. The normal control group tended to select the 
prototype at levels exceeding chance whereas individuals with autism failed to do so. 
From these findings, Klinger and Dawson concluded that individuals with autism 
were unable to abstract summary information from categories in the form of 
prototypes. 
We obtained conflicting findings with an HF A group as reported in Chapter 
3. Both this group and typically developing controls demonstrated a prototype effect 
twice via recognition responses: once where within-category similarity was defined 
in terms of feature size as in Klinger and Dawson's (2001) study and once where 
within-category similarity was defined in terms of the number of features held in 
common between an exemplar and prototype. This discrepancy could be attributable 
to methodological differences between the two experiments. One difference was that 
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in Klinger and Dawson's prototype condition, participants were expected to select 
the best category member. This requirement was either implicit or made explicit if 
the participant sought clarification. It is possible that such a requirement presented 
greater difficulty for the autism group. Both items of each pair presented in the test 
phases looked as if they belonged to the same target category and so there was no 
clear right or wrong answer. This created ambiguity. In addition, no explicit or 
implicit rule was provided to aid the selection of the best item. This type of 
ambiguity was absent in the tasks that the autism groups were successful at. In 
Klinger and Dawson's rule-based conditions, described in Chapter 2, there was only 
one correct answer: Only one item of each test pair was a member of the target 
category. Similarly, in the study reported in Chapter 3, there was only a single 
correct answer: either the test item had been seen before or not. Furthermore, in 
these tasks, either implicit or explicit rules were provided. For example, participants 
were taught how to indicate recognition responses. In Klinger and Dawson's rule-
based conditions participants learnt the correct classification rule (either implicitly or 
explicitly). 
There is some evidence that individuals with autism have difficulty 
interpreting ambiguity in either spoken or written language. This includes problems 
pronouncing homographs correctly. For example, LFA children failed to used 
context to determine the correct pronunciation of the word bow in such sentences as: 
"He had a pink bow" and "He made a deep bow" (Frith & Snowling, 1983). The 
effect has been noted also in HFA and AS groups (Happe, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) report, also, that HF A and AS 
groups had difficulty using context to disambiguate the meaning of spoken sentences 
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such as: "The roar of the fans disturbed the team" where such sentences were 
preceded by a contextualising sentence, for example "The boiler house was noisy". 
One possibility is that children with autism failed to show a prototype effect 
in Klinger and Dawson's (2001) study because of difficulty interpreting the 
ambiguous task requirement rather than any difficulty in prototype formation per se. 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 reported here were designed to test this possibility. 
Participants completed a prototype effect test using cartoon animal categories given 
names (e.g. "Hov"). The requirement to select the best category member was made 
explicit using best test questions (Experiment 5.1). These took the form, for 
example: "Where is the best Hov?" Then, the same participants completed two 
control tasks, the shapes test, and the numbers test (Experiment 5.2). These were 
designed to test interpretation of best test questions by asking participants to make 
selections from alternatives but without the need to abstract a prototype. The aim of 
Experiment 5.3 was to establish an assumption that participants taking the shapes test 
genuinely perceived two or more alternatives from which to choose. 
Experiment 5.1 
The prototype effect test used here was similar to that used by Klinger and 
Dawson (2001) but with a few differences, designed to make the task more sensitive 
to the effect and therefore more sensitive to possible participant group differences. 
Asking participants to study six categories instead of two increased the range on the 
dependent variable (e. g. participants could select a maximum of six prototypes). 
Items that bore low FR to the prototype were added to the test phase to provide a 
more stringent test. To show a prototype effect participants should choose both more 
prototypes and fewer low FR items than medium FR items. The wording of the test 
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question (e.g. "Where is the best Hov?") made the requirement to choose the best 
category member explicit for all participants. (As discussed earlier, in Klinger & 
Dawson's study, only those who queried the task were told to choose the best 
category member.) Ifparticipants have trouble understanding the best test question 
then they should fail to show a prototype effect, or show one that is reduced relative 
to controls. 
Method 
Participants. Two groups took part in the study: HF A children and typically 
developing controls. Two children with HF A and one without were excluded 
because of a recorded history of epilepsy or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. 
The remaining participants were matched on gender (2 girls and 16 boys per group), 
and globally matched on CA and VMA. The children in the autism group had been 
diagnosed by clinicians as having either AS (13) or autism (5) according to criteria 
such as those specified by the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
They were recruited from specialist schools and units and ranged in age from 9 years 
and 5 months to 15 years and 8 months. Children in the control group were recruited 
from schools from Central and South East England. Their ages ranged from 9 years 
and 7 months to 15 years and 7 months. VMA was assessed by the BPVS (L. M. 
Dunn et al., 1997). Table 5.1 summarises participant characteristics. 
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Table 5.1 Participant characteristics 
Autism Group Control 
(n = 18) (n = 18) 
Chronological age (years) 
M 13.13 12.88 
SD 2.02 2.04 
VMA (years) 
M 12.00 12.33 
SD 3.47 3.28 
Range 6.75-17.00 7.42-17.00 
BPVS raw scores 
M 110.11 112.39 
SD 24.59 22.19 
Range 69 - 151 76-150 
Note. VMA = verbal mental age. BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale. VMA 
was derived from the BPVS raw scores. Maximum group difference: t(34) = .38, p 
= .71. 
Materials. Six categories of cartoon animal were created using the method described 
in Experiment 3.2. Each was labeled (e.g. Hov) and structured around a central 
prototype. This possessed features (e.g. neck or nose) that were the category average 
in size. All category members possessed six features that varied along a dimension 
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from value 1 to value 6. All study stimuli were black line drawings occupying a 
maximum area of9 cm by 10 cm on white 20 cm by 12.5 cm cards. Eight study 
items were created for each category. The features of each study item had values of 
either 2 or 5. These bore medium FR (an intermediate level of similarity) to their 
respective category prototypes (each with feature values all at 3.5). See Table 5.2 for 
a description of feature values for the Hov category. The study items of all other 
categories shared the same value structure. 
Table 5.2 Study stimuli: Hov feature values 
Item No.a 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Horn 
length 
5 
2 
5 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
Ear 
length 
2 
2 
5 
5 
5 
2 
5 
2 
Neck 
length 
2 
5 
2 
2 
5 
5 
2 
5 
Leg 
length 
5 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
2 
2 
Note. a All items are medium family resemblance exemplars. 
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Tail Back crest 
length width 
2 5 
2 5 
2 5 
2 5 
5 2 
5 2 
5 2 
5 2 
Test items were printed in the form of a booklet for each participant. (The 
last eight pages contained stimuli for Experiment 5.2.) Each page illustrated a 
prototype, an unstudied medium FR exemplar, and a low FR exemplar all from the 
same category. The positions of exemplars on each page formed an inverted and 
flattened triangle. Figure 5.1 illustrates one page of items belonging to the Hov 
category. Table 5.3 shows the feature values for the test items of all categories. 
Each booklet presented to each HF A participant was assigned to one of two 
counterbalancing orders: Set A or Set B. On each page of the section of the Set A 
booklet used in this experiment, the position of each exemplar type was 
counterbalanced across categories and each occurred in the same position twice. For 
example, the prototype appeared in the middle on the Mek and Gip category pages in 
all Set A booklets. This was the case also with the Set B booklets. However, the 
location - category configurations were varied from Set A. For each prototype effect 
test, page order and category order was randomised. The control group received 
replicas of these booklets. 
Procedure. For each participant, the sixteen study items from the pair of categories 
depicted on the first two pages of the test booklet were shuffled together. The first 
item was placed face up towards one side of the participant and named (e.g. Hov). 
The experimenter (first author) told the participant to study this (and all further 
cards) for three minutes because there would be a memory test later. (Three minutes 
was the maximum amount of time that some of the younger participants with autism 
could be prompted to study the cards.) The experimenter selected an item belonging 
to the other category, placed it towards the other side of the participant, and named it 
(e.g. Mek). From then on study cards were handed singly to the participant who was 
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encouraged to study the card and then place it face up on the pile of cards from the 
same category. Any mistakes in placing the cards were corrected immediately by the 
experimenter. Immediately afterwards, the participant was shown the first page of 
the test booklet. The experimenter said, "Look at all these", pointed briefly to each 
exemplar (from left to right) , and asked where the best category item was: for 
example, "Where is the best Hov?" If the participant did not respond immediately, 
the question was repeated together with the comment, "There is no right or wrong 
answer, just choose the one that you think is best". Any hesitant participants 
responded after a second prompt. Participants indicated selections by marking a 
response box beneath the chosen item. They were then asked to select the best item 
from the other category, that was studied. This was depicted on the second page. 
This study and test procedure was repeated twice more. In this way, each participant 
studied and was tested on all six categories, one pair at a time. 
D D 
D 
Figure 5.1 Test page for the Hov category. Items from left to right are the following 
exemplar types : low FR, medium FR, and prototype. 
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Table 5.3 Test stimuli: Feature values for all categories 
Features 
Category A B C D E F 
(Exemplar Type) 
Hoy (Prototype) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Hoy (Medium FR) 2 5 2 5 5 2 
Hoy (LowFR) 6 1 1 1 6 6 
Raz (Prototype) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Raz (Medium FR) 2 5 5 2 2 5 
Raz (Low FR) 1 6 1 6 6 1 
Mek (Prototype) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Mek (Medium FR) 5 2 5 2 2 5 
Mek (Low FR) 1 6 6 6 1 1 
Gip (Prototype) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Gip (Medium FR) 5 2 2 5 5 2 
Gip (Low FR) 6 1 1 1 6 6 
Dut (Prototype) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Dut (Medium FR) 2 5 5 5 2 2 
Dut (Low FR) 1 6 6 1 1 6 
Bef (Prototype) 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Bef (Medium FR) 5 2 2 2 5 5 
Bef(Low FR) 6 1 6 1 1 6 
Note. FR = family resemblance. A = Hom (HoY, Gip), A= Beak (Raz), A = Hair 
(Mek), A = Nose (Bef, Dut); B = Ear (Hov, Mek, Bet), B= Head crest (Raz, Gip, 
Dut); C = Neck (All); D = Leg (All); E = Tail (All); F = Back crest (HoY, Gip, Mek, 
Bet), F = Wings (Raz, Dut). 
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Results and discussion 
Across the six categories, each exemplar type could be chosen as best 
between 0 and 6 times. The total number of prototypes selected by each participant 
was counted and converted to a proportion out of 6. These choice proportions were 
calculated for medium FR items and low FR items also. The mean choice proportion 
for each exemplar type and participant group is displayed in Table 5.4. Support for 
the idea that a prototype effect shown in response to best test questions would be 
impaired in autism was somewhat equivocal. The data illustrated in Table 5.4 
suggests that both participant groups showed a prototype effect. The mean choice 
proportions increased as similarity to the prototype increased. In addition, the autism 
group appeared to show a weaker effect: They selected fewer prototypes and more 
low FR items than the control group. This observation was confirmed by the fact 
that a Friedman test showed that the difference between exemplar types was 
significant for the control group: Chi -Square = 15.61, df = 2, p < .001; but that the 
difference between exemplar types only showed a trend towards significance for the 
HFA group, Chi-Square = 5.32, df= 2,p = .07. However, this apparent difference 
between participant groups was not supported by t-tests. No significant participant 
group differences were observed for either the low FR items, t(34) = 1.52, p = .14, 
1 
or the prototypes, t(34) = .99, p = .33 . 
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Table 5.4 Mean choice proportions (and standard deviations) for each exemplar type 
and participant group 
Exemplar Type Autism Group Control 
CP CP 
Prototype 
M(SD) .49 (.27) .57 (.23) 
Medium FR 
M(SD) .28 (.16) .30 (.18) 
LowFR 
M(SD) .23 (.23) .13 (.17) 
Note. CP = choice proportion. FR = family resemblance. 
Experiment 5.2 
Participants completed two control tasks: The shapes test and the numbers 
test. Both were designed to test understanding of best test questions without the 
requirement to abstract summary information in the form of prototypes from test 
materials. Participants had to consider several alternatives before selecting one item 
in response to a question as to which was best. The shapes test was designed to 
possess ambiguity similar to that present in Klinger and Dawson's (2001) prototype 
condition and Experiment 5.1. Participants were asked to select the best category 
member from an array of candidates and no rule was provided to aid with selection. 
Both control tasks were structurally identical. However, ambiguity was absent in the 
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numbers test in that a selection rule was provided and for each question, there existed 
a single objectively correct answer. If difficulties lie specifically with ambiguity 
then impairment should be observed with the shapes test only. Furthermore, if 
difficulty with ambiguity is responsible for the weaker prototype effect shown by the 
HF A group (Experiment 5.1) then there should be a relationship between 
performances on the shapes test and the prototype effect test. 
Method 
Participants. The same participants from Experiment 5.1 took part. 
Materials. The last eight pages of the booklet described in Experiment 5.1 formed 
the control tasks. Each page of the shapes test depicted six items, presented in a row, 
with a response box beneath each item. Within each row was a pair of canonical 
shapes or letters as follows: letter C and letter 0, letter H and letter A, square and 
diamond, and circle and oval. The remaining four items of each row were hybrids 
representing intermediate points along a continuum of similarity between the two 
canonical items. These intermediates were spaced evenly across the continuum. For 
example, varying the size of the gap at the apex of the letter A created intermediates 
of the H-to-A array. The size of this gap increased by a standard measurement 
(2mm) as the intermediate approximated the canonical letter H. This array was 
similar to that created by Hampton (1996). The remaining arrays were created 
specifically for the study. See Figure 5.2 for an illustration of the shapes test arrays. 
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Figure 5.2 Shapes test stimuli. Arrays from top to bottom: letter C to letter 0, letter 
H to letter A, square to diamond, and circle to oval. Each row of shapes or letters 
together with the row of response boxes below was presented on a separate page. 
Each page of the numbers test presented a table of numbers as if they were 
school test results. The top row listed the subjects: English, mathematics, French, or 
science. The second row listed children's names: different for each subject. The 
third row listed the test scores. The fourth row was left empty for the participants to 
place their responses. (The test scores were as follows: science - 14,27, 36, 53, 99, 
100; mathematics - 17, 24, 37, 69, 70, 84; English - 10, 18,29, 80, 86, 88; French-
3, 32, 56, 58, 59, 94.) 
All participants completed the control tasks immediately after completing 
the prototype effect test (Experiment 5.1). This order was selected to avoid any 
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possible training effect from the control tasks. The pages depicting the shapes and 
numbers tests of each booklet belonged to the same counterbalancing order, Set A or 
Set B, as the rest of the booklet presented in Experiment 5.1. For both sets, the 
position of items within each array or table varied randomly. These random orders 
were held constant within each set. The order of arrays or school subjects was 
randomised within each booklet and the presentation order of the shapes and 
numbers tests was counterbalanced across each set. As mentioned in Experiment 
5.1, control group participants received replica booklets. 
Procedure. For each page of the shapes test the experimenter said, "Look at all 
these" and pointed briefly to each item (from left to right). Then the participant was 
asked to point to the target canonical item, for example, "Where is the best letter H?" 
Other targets comprised the letter C, the square, and the circle. The participant 
responded by marking a response box. At the first page of the numbers test, the 
participant was told that the numbers represented test marks for each of the named 
children, that high numbers were "good", and low numbers were "bad". At each 
page, the participant was told to look at all the numbers and asked, "Who has the best 
science (mathematics, English, or French) score?" The participant responded by 
marking the row beneath one of the numbers. 
Results and discussion 
Shapes test. Each selection from each array of the shapes test was assigned 
an integer from 1 to 6. These integers reflected similarity between the selected item 
and the target canonical item: for example, 6 was assigned to the correct canonical 
item, 5 was assigned to the next most similar item, and so forth. The integers, 
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corresponding to the items chosen from each array, were summed to give a total 
score (maximum = 24). This was then converted to proportions to give the 
proportion of shapes score for each participant. Every control group participant 
obtained the maximum proportion of shapes score of 1. The number of autism 
participants scoring a proportion of shapes score of 1 was 12 out of 18. The mean 
proportion of shapes score of the HFA group was .97 (SD = .04). The difference 
between participant groups was significant: t(17) = 2.61,p = .02 (equal variances not 
assumed).2 
To explore a possible relationship between the proportion of shapes score 
and developmental variables in the HF A group, CA and VMA were split on the mean 
proportion of shapes score for all participants (.99). Those in the low proportion of 
shapes score group (scoring below the mean) had a lower average CA (M = 11.89 
years, SD = 2.31) and lower average VMA (M = 10.61 years, SD = 3.44) than the 
high proportion of shapes score group (that scored above the mean): CA: M = 13.76, 
SD = 1.63; VMA: M = 12.70, SD = 3.41. The difference in CA showed a trend 
towards significance: t(16) = 2.00, p = .06. The difference in VMA was not 
significant: t( 16) = 1.22, p = .24) although, with a sample size of six, power was low. 
It appears that the six HF A participants in the low proportion of shapes score group 
were unlikely to be making random selections. A one-sample t-test demonstrated 
their proportion of shapes scores to be well above chance (.58): t(5) = 22.13, P < 
.001. 
Numbers test. As with the shapes test, each selection from each table of the numbers 
test was scored separately and assigned an integer from 1 (for the lowest test score) 
to 6 (the highest test score). The integers were summed to give a total (maximum = 
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24) and converted to proportions to give the proportion of numbers score for each 
participant. All but one of the control participants obtained the maximum proportion 
of numbers score of 1, the remaining participant scored .96. The number ofHFA 
participants scoring a proportion of numbers score of 1 was 13. The mean proportion 
of numbers score of the HF A group and control group was. 96 (SD = .11) and 1 (SD 
= .01) respectively. The difference between participant groups was not significant: 
t(17) = 1.52,p = .15 (equal variances not assumed).3 
The finding of group differences on the shapes test but not the numbers test 
is in keeping with the prediction made earlier that HF A participants would have 
trouble with the shapes test if they had difficulty understanding the ambiguity 
inherent in the task. However, this conclusion applies only to one third of HF A 
participants tested here. 
Relationship between prototype effect test and shapes test. Although there was no 
statistically significant difference between groups on the prototype effect test, the 
HF A group appeared to show a somewhat weaker effect. To see if there was any 
relationship between the shapes test scores and the prototype effect test scores, 
participants were split into three groups: Six HF A participants who scored below the 
mean (HFA low scorers), twelve HFA participants who scored above the mean (HFA 
high scorers) and eighteen control participants that also scored above the mean. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the choice proportion means of each exemplar type for each of 
these groups. This shows almost identical prototype effects for the HF A high scorers 
and the control group. In contrast, means obtained by the HF A low scorers do not 
form a prototype effect as shown by the relatively high choice proportion mean for 
low FR items and the relatively low choice proportion mean for prototypes. 
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Consistent with this observation, Friedman tests revealed a significant difference 
between exemplar types for the HFA high scorers: Chi-Square = 6.89, df= 2,p = .03, 
but no significant difference for the low scorers: Chi-Square = 1, df = 2, p = .6. 
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Figure 5.3 Mean choice proportion (CP) for each participant group and exemplar 
type. P = prototype, M = medium FR, L = low FR. HF A-HS = HF A high scorers: 
participants scoring above the mean on the shapes test (n = 6). HFA-LS = HF A low 
scorers: participants scoring below the mean on the shapes test (n = 12). Control 
group: n = 18. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
To examine participant group differences directly, the presentation order of 
the control tasks was included in the following analysis of choice proportion scores 
for prototypes: A 3 (group) x 2 (order) ANOVA, where group comprised HFA high 
scorers, HFA low scorers and the control group. (Levene's test of equality of error 
variance was significant at F (5,30) = 4.87,p = .002.) Neither of the main effects or 
the interaction was significant: maximum F (2,30) = 1.66, p = .21. Games-Howell 
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post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between the HF A low scorers and the 
control group: mean difference = .21,p = .03. No other differences were significant: 
HFA low scorers versus HFA high scorers: mean difference = .19, p = .17 and HF A 
high scorers versus control group: mean difference = .02, p = .98. The choice 
proportion scores for low FR exemplars were analysed by a 3 (group) x 2 (order) 
ANOV A. The main effect of group was significant: F(2,30) = 4.30, p = .02. Neither 
the main effect of order or the interaction was significant: maximum F(1,30) = .36, p 
= .55. Games-Howell post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between the 
HFA low scorers and the control group: mean difference = .26,p = .03. None of the 
other differences were statistically significant: HF A low scorers versus HF A high 
scorers: mean difference = .24, p = .06 and HFA higher scorers versus controls: mean 
difference = .02,p = .95. 
In keeping with the prediction made earlier there did seem to be some 
association between performance on the shapes test question and performance on the 
prototype best question. HF A participants that failed to perform at ceiling on the 
shapes test also failed to show a prototype effect. 
Experiment 5.3 
The aim of this experiment was to check an assumption made for the shapes 
test: When participants were asked to select the best example of the target category 
(e.g. the letter C), they were genuinely perceiving two or more candidates as 
belonging to this category. This issue pertained to the shapes test only because this 
test was unique in one respect: Participants were making selections from exemplars 
belonging to one of two categories. Potentially, only one item in each array could be 
perceived as a target category member, with the remainder belonging to the non-
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target category. If this were the case performance on the shapes test could not be 
affected by ambiguity as claimed earlier because participants would perceive only 
one answer to such questions as, "Where is the best letter C?" 
Method 
Participants. Twelve of the eighteen HFA participants from Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 
took part. Five HFA participants completed Experiment 5.3 immediately after 
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2. The remainder completed Experiment 5.3 after a lapse of 
up to 17 months. For this experiment, the ages of the HFA participants ranged from 
10 years 9 months to 15 years 10 months (M= 13.84 years, SD = 1.45 years). The 
VMA of the HFA participants ranged from 7 years 10 months to 17 years (M = 12.60 
years, SD = 3.05 years). Four of the participants had diagnoses of autism and eight 
had a diagnosis of AS. Three were HF A low scorers. All members of the control 
group participated and completed Experiment 5.3 immediately after the earlier 
experiments. There was no significant group difference (HF A vs. controls) on either 
of the developmental variables: CA - t (28) = 1.51, p = .14 (equal variances not 
assumed) and VMA - t(28) = .23, P = .82. 
Materials. These comprised the shapes test booklet used in Experiment 5.2. 
Procedure. Using the test booklet he or she had completed in Experiment 5.2, each 
participant was asked to indicate which items were members of the target category 
for each shapes test array: for example, "You chose this one as the best letter C, now 
show me all the ones that you think are a letter C too. You can choose all of these or 
none of these or anything in between". Most participants indicated their responses 
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by putting a mark underneath their selected items. Five HF A participants did not 
respond to this question, but responded when the experimenter pointed to each item 
asking, for example, "Is this a letter C?" The experimenter moved onto the next 
array after the participant indicated that they had completed their response. 
Results and discussion 
The number of items selected as belonging to the target category was 
counted for each array and each participant (maximum = 6). All selections included 
the previous choice of best category member. This score was converted to 
proportions: the proportion of membership decisions. Figure 5.4 illustrates the mean 
proportion of membership decisions for each array and participant group. As can be 
seen from the graph, target categories in general were perceived as containing more 
than one category member. Furthermore, the HF A group made target category 
selections which were fewer and which varied less across arrays than those made by 
the control group. Significant participant group differences were observed on arrays 
that elicited a high proportion of membership decisions from the control group (the 
square-to-diamond array and the C-to-O array). The scores were analysed with a 2 
(group) x 4 (array) mixed, repeated measures ANOVA. This revealed significant 
main effects of group: F (1,28) = 5.28, p = .03 and of array: Greenhouse-Geisser F 
(2, 63) = 11.75, p <.001. The interaction of group by array was significant also: 
Greenhouse-Geisser F (2,63)= 4.46,p = .01. Using the method described by 
Howell (1997, pp. 470-471), simple effects analyses, with Fcrit (1,110) ｾ］＠ 3.92 and 
alpha = .05, revealed significant participant group differences on the proportion of 
membership decisions for both the Squares and the letter Cs: Square - Fobs (1,110) = 
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25 .50, letter C - Fobs (1,110) = 4.24. Group differences on the letter H and the 
circles were not significant: letter H - F obs (1 ,110) = .63 , circles - F obs(1 , 11 0) < .01. 
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Figure 5.4 Mean proportion of membership decisions (PMD) for each participant 
group and array in the shapes test. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
As mentioned earlier, some HF A participants would not select items in 
response to a single question and only responded when asked to judge each item 
individually. To see whether the introduction of this alternative question form was 
responsible for the narrower category judgements shown by the HF A group the data 
for this participant group was entered into a 2 (question wording) x 4 (array) mixed, 
repeated measures ANOVA. Neither the main effect of question wording or the 
interaction was significant: maximum F(3 ,30) = .54, P = .66. 
It seems unlikely that the restricted category membership decisions shown 
by the HFA children could be attributable to response poverty. This condition would 
result in fewer item selections in response to the original question wording (e.g. 
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" ... show me all the ones that you think are a letter C ... ") but not to the alternative 
(e.g. "Is this a letter C?"). Therefore, the fact that the manipulation of question 
wording had no effect on item selection provides not support for this explanation of 
reduced membership decisions. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the HF A group 
were making completely random selections. This is because, with one exception, all 
participants (HF A and control) selected items that formed a consecutive sequence, in 
terms of similarity, around the target canonical item. 
General discussion 
Experiment 5.1 provided partial support for the notion that a prototype 
effect is reduced in HF A participants in response to best test questions. The effect 
shown by the HF A group was weaker than that shown by the control group but the 
difference was insufficient to reach statistical significance. Experiment 5.2 clarified 
the picture further by showing a clear association between performance on one of the 
control tasks, the shapes test, and the prototype effect test. One third of HF A 
participants failed to obtain full marks on the shapes test and to show a prototype 
effect. The remainder performed at ceiling on the shapes test and showed a 
prototype effect identical to that of the control group. Thus, it seems that the 
performance of the HFA group as a whole, in Experiment 5.1, masked the 
performance of a subgroup that failed to show any prototype effect. 
The shapes test was assumed to possess a similar form of ambiguity to the 
prototype effect test: Participants were expected to choose from two or more 
alternatives with no clear rules to guide them. The assumption that alternatives were 
perceived was checked in Experiment 5.3 by asking participants to indicate the 
number of items in each array that they regarded as belonging to the target category. 
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The findings supported this assumption. In general, participants were selecting from 
two or more options. In addition, the HF A children identified fewer items as 
members of the target categories, and the number of selections varied less across 
arrays, than those of the control group. 
The findings reported here suggest that a dissociation between rule-based 
and prototype-based categorisation, as proposed by Klinger and Dawson (1995), 
does not apply to HFA participants. The majority of whom, in the current study, did 
show a prototype effect in response to best test questions. Those that failed to show 
an effect, these tended to be the younger participants, also failed to perform 
optimally on the shapes test. This association supports the idea presented earlier, that 
children with autism might fail to show a prototype effect in response to best test 
questions because of difficulty resolving the ambiguity of the task, rather than an 
inability to abstract prototypes per se. Finally, it appeared that the HF A group was 
not behaving like classical categorisers as suggested by Klinger and Dawson (1995). 
If HF A participants were behaving in the manner predicted by the classical view, 
they would apply if. .. then rules to all items in the square-to-diamond array presented 
in Experiment 5.3. This would result in the classification of all items as squares, 
because all possessed the necessary and sufficient criteria for membership of this 
category. However, HFA participants classified fewer items of the array as squares 
than controls. 
The association between performances on the shapes test and the prototype 
effect test casts doubt also on Klinger and Dawson's claim that LFA participants are 
unable to form prototypes. The implication is that these participants may also fail to 
show a prototype effect because of difficulty resolving the ambiguity inherent in the 
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task. If other tests of prototype formation with this popUlation, without such 
ambiguity, provided no evidence of impairment this view would be supported. 
Experiment 5.3 identified another possible area of abnormality in 
categorisation. The HF A group made restrictive category membership decisions. 
This finding is consistent with the view that autism is characterised by a reduction in 
generalisation ability (Plaisted, 2001; Plaisted et al., Submitted; Plaisted et al., 
1998a). This is the view, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, that individuals with autism 
process similarity between stimuli or situations relatively poorly and similarity 
between unique features relatively well. Such a reduced perception of similarity 
would also mean that the intermediates of the arrays presented in the shapes test, 
Experiment 5.3, would be perceived as less similar to the target canonical item. 
Consequently, the boundaries of the category defined by this target item would 
contain fewer items. It is generally accepted that such boundary placements are 
determined by perceived similarity (Hampton, 1997; Murphy, 2002). Furthermore, 
this perceptual abnormality is consistent with the lack of variability in category 
membership decisions, made by the HFA group, across arrays. Presumably, a 
reduction in perceived similarity would place a ceiling on the maximum number of 
category members that could be selected for each array and this in tum would reduce 
variability across arrays. 
One difficulty with this account is that the majority of HF A participants do 
not behave as if they have a reduced perception of similarity when they display 
prototype effects (Chapter 3, and Experiment 5.2). As discussed earlier, a common 
assumption is that perceived similarity between exemplars and a prototype 
determines prototype effects so a reduced perception of similarity should lead to a 
reduced or absent prototype effect. It appears that the perception of similarity, by 
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individuals with autism, is dependent upon the nature of the tests that are used. It is 
unclear, at present, why certain tasks and stimuli should affect perceived similarity 
but not others. 
An alternative way of viewing participant group differences in category 
membership decisions is that they reflect differences in processing style. According 
to central coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994) normal individuals 
tend by default to process globally taking in the overall appearance of a scene before 
focusing on smaller details. However, individuals with autism have a tendency 
towards a local processing style: a focus on details at the expense of global 
configuration. Evidence for this preference includes the fact that individuals with 
autism show superiority on the embedded figures task (Shah & Frith, 1983). This 
task necessitates a focus on local parts at the expense of the whole and the aim is to 
discern a small shape within a larger picture. If members of the control group, in 
Experiment 5.3, were processing globally, they might consider not only the similarity 
between a single item in an array and the target canonical item, but also the similarity 
between a single item and all other items in the array. This seems plausible given 
evidence that the category membership of an exemplar is determined not only by 
similarity to a prototype, as discussed in the introduction, but recent evidence 
suggests that such exemplars are compared also with other category members 
(Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002). For instance, similar exemplars are likely to 
belong to the same category and conversely dissimilar exemplars are likely to belong 
to different categories. A preference for local processing might mean that HF A 
participants focused only on the similarity between a single item and the target 
canonical item whilst ignoring the other items in the array. Therefore, the difference 
in category membership decisions between the two participant groups could be 
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attributable to differences in processing style and correspondingly, a tendency to use 
different information for making the similarity judgements from which category 
membership decisions are made. 
The preceding discussion highlights two accounts of how aspects of the 
category membership task may have led the HF A participants to make restrictive 
category membership decisions. Theoretically, it is also possible that the restricted 
category membership decisions reflect conceptual representation in autism: that is 
concepts represented with tighter boundaries containing fewer exemplars. Such 
representations would contain only the most prototypical items because, as well as 
selecting fewer items, HF A participants in the current study selected items that were 
most similar to the target canonical items. Available evidence suggests that such a 
representation is unlikely. As mentioned in the introduction, no participant group 
differences were found in how prototypicality affected errors in categorising 
exemplars from basic level and superordinate categories (Tager-Flusberg, 1985a, 
1985b). If such concepts were represented by fewer and more typical exemplars, 
then participant group differences should have been found, with the LF A group 
making more errors on the peripheral category members. (Such members would be 
less likely to be included within the concepts). In addition, performance on the word 
fluency task presented by Dunn et al. (1996) does not support the idea that concepts 
in general have narrower representations in autism. No participant group differences 
were found in the number of correct exemplars produced. If representation of these 
semantic categories contained fewer category members, then the production of 
exemplars should be reduced relative to controls (assuming equivalent verbal fluency 
between the two participant groups). Moreover, the HFA participants tended to 
produce a higher proportion of peripheral items as category examples. If category 
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membership were restricted to only the most typical items, then the reverse should be 
the case. The exclusion of the most peripheral items from the category 
representations should result in a relatively low production of these items. 
In summary, the findings of the current study suggest that the dissociation 
proposed by Klinger and Dawson (1995, 2001) between rule-based and prototype-
based categorisation does not extend to HF A participants. In addition, the current 
study identified another area of abnormality in categorisation, as shown by the 
tendency of HF A participants to make restricted category membership decisions. 
Existing evidence suggests that in general conceptual representations in autism are 
not reduced. Therefore, it seems that the findings may be specific to the particular 
task used in Experiment 5.3. Only further studies, in which a variety of methods are 
used to assess breadth of category membership, can establish the conditions under 
which such decisions are restricted and the relationship of these findings to broader 
theoretical accounts such central coherence theory (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 
1994) and the view that the perception of similarity is reduced in autism (Plaisted, 
2001). 
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Footnotes 
1 An analysis of difference scores (low FR choice proportions subtracted 
from prototype choice proportions) also failed to find a significant difference 
between participant groups: t(34) = 1.32,p = .20. 
2Fisher's Exact Test also revealed a significant participant group difference 
on the proportion of participants scoring above and below the mean proportion of 
shapes score: p = .02. 
3Fisher's Exact Test also failed to show a significant participant group 
difference on the proportion of participants scoring above and below the mean 
proportion of numbers score (M = .98, SD = .08): p = .18. 
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CHAPTER 6 - From prototype formation to perception of similarity 
6.1 Summary 
Introduction 
A formal description of autism and the closely related condition AS first 
appeared in the writings of Kanner (1943) and Asperger (1944). Today the 
conditions are recognised as belonging within a continuum of pervasive 
developmental disorders. They are diagnosed following the detection of 
abnormalities in reciprocal social interaction, and the demonstration of marked 
stereotypies in behaviour or interest. A diagnosis of autism requires an additional 
impairment in communicative language. The prevalence rate for these disorders 
ranges from 4-50: 10,000 depending on the diagnostic criteria used. Evidence of a 
genetic cause is overwhelming. 
Since the early eighties, theorising in autism research has tended to operate 
from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology. The defining feature of these theories 
tends to be the nature of the particular abnormality adopted as a basic level to other 
secondary characteristic of autism. Theories that adopt cognitive (non-social) basic 
level abnormalities include impairments in abstraction and concept use (Hermelin & 
O'Connor, 1970), the TOM hypothesis (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), weak central 
coherence (Frith, 1989), executive function deficits (Russell, 1997), and attentional 
deficits (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1989). An exception to this trend is Hobson's account 
(e.g. R. Peter. Hobson, 1993) which considers the basic level deficit to include 
cognition, affect, and conation considered jointly at the inter-personal level. Also 
Baron-Cohen's (2002) extreme male brain hypothesis spans both social and 
cognitive domains at the basic level. 
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This thesis focussed on conceptual impairments in autism. This notion has a 
long history and the evidence is somewhat mixed. Straightforward categorisation 
tasks testing well-established knowledge revealed no differences between autism and 
control groups, whereas other tasks testing the processes involved in concept 
formation have tended to reveal impairments. This thesis examined one particular 
abnormality: that individuals with autism fail to show prototype effects (Klinger & 
Dawson, 2001; Plaisted et al., Submitted). This finding has been described variously 
as representing: an inability to form prototypes (Klinger and Dawson,), the operation 
of weak central coherence (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994), and an effect ofa 
reduced perception of similarity (Plaisted, 2001). HF A children were tested to 
remove the confound of intellectual disability. Owing to problems of differential 
diagnosis, and lack of evidence that HF A and AS are distinct syndromes, children 
that had received either diagnosis were included within the same participant group. 
Experimental chapters 
All studies reported in the thesis involved two participants groups, one of 
HF A children and one of typically developing controls. The three studies reported in 
Chapter 3 tested whether or not children with autism could show prototype effects in 
recognition memory. 
Experiment 3.1 was designed as a control task to test general recognition 
memory. Participants studied line drawings of representational objects (e.g. animals 
and vehicles). Then, they were tested with a mixture of "old" and "new" pictures 
and asked to indicate recognition of each item. Both participant groups performed 
similarly with high levels of correct recognition scores. Thus, any impairment on the 
subsequent prototype effect test using an identical recognition test procedure could 
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not be attributable to deficits in visual recognition memory. Stimuli were picture 
cards representing cartoon animal categories, very similar to those used by Klinger 
and Dawson (2001). All study stimuli bore medium FR to respective category 
prototypes. Test stimuli comprised (in order of decreasing similarity to the 
prototype): the prototype, high FR, medium FR (both old and new), and low FR 
exemplars. The two experiments (3.2 and 3.3.) differed only in the similarity 
structure of the categories (average vs. modal). 
In both experiments, all participant groups demonstrated full prototype 
effects. Higher levels of positive recognition were obtained for prototypes and high 
FR items than for medium FR items, and these in tum received higher levels of 
positive recognition than low FR exemplars. Thus the studies reported in Chapter 3, 
demonstrated that HF A children could show full prototype effects and behave as if 
they had abstracted prototypes from categories. 
The results suggested that impairments in prototype formation were not 
characteristic of HF A children. They also represented an instance where HF A 
individuals appeared not to suffer a reduced perception of similarity. Furthermore, 
the findings were seen as an example of intact central coherence. 
Several methodological differences were noted between the studies reported 
in Chapter 3, demonstrating full prototype effects, and the studies reported earlier 
that failed to show prototype effects with the autism group. One difference 
concerned the nature of the task at test. Impaired prototype effects were obtained via 
categorisation responses (Klinger & Dawson, 200 I; Plaisted et al., Submitted) 
whereas intact prototype effects were obtained via recognition responses (Chapter 3). 
Thus, the aim of the study described in Chapter 4 was to investigate the suggestion 
that individuals with autism might exhibit a dissociation: impaired prototype effects 
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shown via categorisation responses and intact prototype effects shown via 
recognition memory responses. An additional aim was to explore the effect of 
repeated learning trials on both recognition and categorisation responses. Stimuli 
were dot patterns presented on computer. All participants completed four conditions: 
two recognition tests and two categorisation tests counterbalanced with exposure to 
study exemplars (one trial vs. six trials). 
Each condition followed the same classic prototype effect paradigm used in 
Chapter 3. Participants completed a study phase followed by a test phase. During 
the study phase, participants viewed medium FR exemplars from two dot pattern 
categories and during the test phase, participants viewed high FR exemplars, medium 
FR exemplars (old and new), and low FR exemplars. This time, similarity to the 
prototype was determined by Posner et al. 's (1967) distortion rules. 
Separate analyses were carried out on old recognition responses, new 
recognition responses, old categorisation responses, and new categorisation 
responses. Analysis of new responses showed no support for the notion that 
recognition and categorisation prototype effects were dissociable in autism. Both 
participant groups showed prototype effects via both recognition and categorisation 
responses. However, in contrast to the findings reported in Chapter 3, these effects 
were only partial, reflecting differences between medium and low FR exemplars 
only. The difference between medium and high FR exemplars was not significant 
for either participant group. The interpretation offered was that the high FR 
exemplar types were insufficiently similar to the prototype and too similar to the 
medium FR exemplars to produce differential responding between the two exemplar 
types. 
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Unsurprisingly, for both participant groups, the categorisation of both old 
and new items was more accurate after six learning trials than after one learning trial. 
This variable, condition (one vs. six learning trials), had little difference on 
recognition responses to new items. On old items though, there was an interaction 
between trial and group on recognition responses. HF A children were less likely to 
recognise items as old than controls after one learning trial, though their perfonnance 
caught up with that of the control group after six learning trials. Calculation and 
analysis of A' (Ch. 4, Footnote 1) suggested that this was genuinely an effect of 
memory sensitivity rather than one of response bias or criterion. These findings 
contrast with previous studies demonstrating intact visual recognition memory in 
HFA children, including Experiment 3.1. (However, the analysis of A' scores for 
recognition responses to medium FR exemplars of the average category did reveal a 
reduced memory sensitivity on the part of the autism group. See Ch. 3, Footnote 1.) 
One suggestion was that the impairment reflected difficulty encoding meaningless 
stimuli (of which the dot patterns were an example). This possibility was raised by 
Ameli et al.(1988) who found that HF A participants perfonned poorly on tests of 
visual recognition for abstract, meaningless shapes. Perfonnance on meaningful 
materials matched that of controls, however. These authors' interpretation was that 
the difficulty with meaningless material reflected the use of inflexible cognitive 
strategies that failed to organise and encode the visual infonnation effectively. 
Experiment 4.1 was marked also by a pervasive influence from presentation 
order effects (one-trial condition first vs. six-trial condition first). These were 
viewed as being the result of differences in category learning occurring within both 
participant groups. 
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The aim of the studies reported in Chapter 5 was to test the suggestion 
raised in Chapter 3 that individuals with autism may have failed to show a prototype 
effect during Klinger and Dawson's study because of task-related ambiguity. 
Participants completed a prototype effect task (Experiment 5.1), procedurally similar 
to those reported in Chapter 3. The stimuli were similar, also, to those used in 
Experiment 3.2 (cartoon animals structured around an average prototype). During 
the study phases, participants studied medium FR exemplars. 
During the test phases, participants were asked to select the best category 
member (e.g. Hov). This selection was from three exemplars, all new unstudied 
items: a high FR, medium FR, and low FR exemplars. Both participant groups 
appeared to show prototype effects although that of the HF A group appeared 
somewhat weaker. However, no participant group differences were obtained. 
Experiment 5.2 was designed to test whether HF A participants interpreted the test 
question used in Experiment 5.1 similarly to controls. The numbers test required 
participants to select the best result from a table of school test results. The shapes 
test required the selection of the best example of a particular shape or letter. For both 
tasks, scores were at or near ceiling for most participants. Participant group 
differences were found on the shapes test but not the numbers test. On this task, 
HF A participants performed less well than controls. The account offered was that 
some of these participants had difficulty with the ambiguity present in the shapes 
test. 
Another finding was the presence of a relationship between performances on 
the shapes test and the prototype effect task. One third of the HF A participants who 
did not reach ceiling on the shapes test also did not show a prototype effect. The 
remainder of HF A participants demonstrated a prototype effect that was identical to 
128 
that shown by the control group. This relationship was seen as support for the 
suggestion made in Chapter 3, that children with autism might find the ambiguity 
inherent in a "best test question" problematical rather prototype formation per se. 
However, this notion was applicable to only to the third of HF A participants this 
study that failed to show a prototype effect. 
A further study, Experiment 5.3, was designed to test an assumption behind 
the design of the shapes test. This is that participants were genuinely selecting the 
best item from more than one member of a category. Participants were shown shapes 
test materials and were asked to select the number of items that belonged to each 
target category. The findings supported this assumption. Furthermore, HF A 
children tended to select significantly fewer items as belonging to a particular 
category. These findings were interpreted either as an example of reduced 
perception of similarity or as representing different processing preferences between 
the two participant groups: with the HF A group preferring local processing and the 
control group tending to rely upon global processing. 
6.2 Conclusion 
Implications for prototype formation in autism and associated theories 
Considered together the studies reported in the experimental chapters (3-5) 
suggested that the majority of HF A participants do show prototype effects and there 
was no evidence to suggest that such effects were weaker than those displayed by the 
control groups. The fact that variation in methodology between the studies 
nonetheless produced results that converged upon a similar pattern indicates that 
these findings are robust. Such variation included the inclusion of three separate 
pairs of participant group (HF A vs. controls). The nature of the materials used also 
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varied across studies. Three used cartoon animals (Chapter 3 and Chapter 5), and 
one employed abstract dot patterns (Chapter 4). Additionally, similarity between a 
prototype and exemplars was defined differently. With cartoon animal categories, 
similarity was defined in terms of the size of animal features or in terms of the 
frequency with which features occurred in the study set. When dot patterns were 
used, similarity was defined in terms of the two dimensional loci of individual dots. 
Finally, the nature of the test phases varied across experiments. These included 
old/new recognition, classical categorisation (classifying stimuli into one of two 
categories), and identification of the "best" category member. 
The clear presence of prototype effects in HF A participants has imp lication 
for the various theoretical accounts, introduced in Chapter 2. Firstly, the 
demonstration of prototype effects showed that Klinger and Dawson's notion that 
prototype formation is impaired in autism does not apply to HF A participants. 
Secondly, according to Klinger and Dawson (2001), the failure of their autism group 
to show prototype effects represents the operation of weak central coherence. If this 
is the case, intact prototype effects, as reported here, reflect the operation of intact 
central coherence. 
The use of the word if in the previous sentence reflects some of the 
difficulty present in defining examples of weak central coherence. Central coherence 
has been defined both as a preference for local processing over global processing and 
as a difficulty in integrating information in context. The exhibition of prototype 
effects, according to Klinger and Dawson (2001) reflect the operation of the latter 
definition. These definitions are rather general and, in practice, weak central 
coherence is often defined in terms of examples of tasks with which individuals with 
autism show different behaviour from controls. This practice involves the risk of 
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circularity and makes the theory difficult to falsify. The only certain implication that 
can be drawn from the thesis studies for central coherence is that if Klinger and 
Dawson's findings represent a manifestation of weak central coherence, then the 
studies reported here represent examples of intact central coherence. One scenario 
cannot be true without the other being true also. 
The prototype effects shown by HF A participants also provide a 
demonstration that individuals with autism do not always suffer a reduced perception 
in similarity, contrary to the implications of the account proposed by Plaisted (200 l). 
(As perceived similarity between exemplars and the prototype is thought to 
determine the size of a prototype effect, a reduced perception in similarity should 
result in reduced or absent prototype effects.) To account for the findings reported 
in this thesis, the account would need to be adapted to explain why and how 
perception of similarity might vary within an HF A group, from a normal perception 
to a reduced perception. 
Limitations 
Although, the current studies have established that HF A participants can 
show prototype effects, they are far from establishing why the two other empirical 
studies, Klinger and Dawson (2001) and Plaisted et al. (Submitted), failed to show 
such effects. A number of features, perhaps, contributed to this state of affairs: 
Overall, the studies reported here were without developmental perspective. 
Children varying in age from 9 to 17 years were included within single experimental 
groupings. The performance of different age groupings was not directly compared 
with each other. Although, as discussed in Chapter 3, prototype abstraction is not 
thought to follow a developmental trajectory, the possibility remains that the mental 
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functions that support the display of prototype effects do follow a developmental 
trajectory. Therefore, the age of participants may have a bearing on whether or not 
prototype effects are shown. Although the average age of Klinger and Dawson's 
participants was similar to those in the studies reported here, their participant groups 
included younger children. The failure of their autism group to show a prototype 
effect therefore could be attributable to the lower chronological ages of some of the 
participants. Without a direct comparison of age groupings, this possibility cannot 
be excluded. Furthermore, there was some indication from findings reported in 
Experiment 5.2 that age may be a critical factor. The sub-group of HF A children that 
failed to show a prototype effect tended to be younger than the HF A children that did 
show an effect. 
A similar point could be made regarding IQ level. The narrow focus on 
HF A participants meant that the effect of learning disability on prototype effects was 
not directly examined. Again, as was the case for CA, it appears that prototype 
formation is independent of IQ, but that functions supporting the display of prototype 
effects may be dependent upon IQ. One example cited in Chapter 3, was that LFA 
children, but not HF A children, showed a decrement on visual recognition tests 
(Barth et al., 1995). Such an impairment could have prevented the LFA participants 
in Klinger and Dawson's study from encoding the animal features necessary for 
prototype formation. No LF A participants were included as comparison groups in 
the studies reported in this thesis so this contribution of developmental delay was not 
directly tested. 
Another limitation is the fact that each set of experiments described in each 
chapter showed considerable methodological variation from the studies carried out 
by Klinger and Dawson (2001) and Plaisted et al (Submitted). For example, in 
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Experiment 5.1, low FR exemplars were included and these were absent in Klinger 
and Dawson's study. These types of alteration made it difficult to pinpoint which 
methodological variations were responsible (if any) for discrepancies between the 
findings. 
In addition, methodology varied considerably across the set of studies 
reported in each chapter. This meant that any participant group differences found 
need to be regarded with some caution until these are replicated. The reason for this 
is that the well-documented heterogeneity of the HFA group means that single 
findings obtained from small samples, as was the case with these group differences, 
may not be generally applicable to HF A participants as a whole. 
A discussion of these limitations would be incomplete (and unnecessarily 
gloomy) without pointing out that many of the same decisions that resulted in these 
limitations also contributed to the main strengths of the studies described here. The 
methodological variety of the studies added weight to the conclusion above that HF A 
participants can and do show prototype effects. In addition, the resultant unanswered 
questions, and varied findings open several avenues for future research and it is to 
this we now turn. 
Future research 
Suggestions for future research already put forward in this thesis can be 
divided roughly into two categories: further testing of the key theories put forward in 
Chapter 2 (impaired prototype formation, Klinger & Dawson, 2001, reduced 
perception of similarity, Plaisted, 2001, and weak central coherence, Frith, 1989; 
Frith & Happe, 1994) and the follow up of individual findings (chiefly impaired 
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visual recognition memory, Experiment 4.1, and reduced category membership 
decisions, Experiment 5.3). 
When the first studies reported in Chapter 3 demonstrated clear prototype 
effects in autism two suggestions were put forward. One was that a dissociation 
between recognition and categorisation produced differences in prototype effect 
performance. No evidence was found to support this (Chapter 4). The other 
suggestion that was tested was that children with autism found the ambiguity 
inherent in Klinger and Dawson's test question problematic. Some of the findings 
reported in Chapter 5 were consistent with this notion: specifically the association 
between the prototype effect test and the shapes test. Further research into this area 
could consist of replication of the prototype effect task and the use of a shapes test 
that did not produce ceiling effects. This would allow a correlation between 
performances on the two tasks and as such would constitute a more rigorous test of 
an association between them. Including comparison groups of younger autism 
participants and LF A children would enable an analysis of the contribution of these 
developmental variables to the demonstration of prototype effects. 
Owing to the problems in defining weak central coherence, it is perhaps 
better at this stage to avoid direct testing of this construct. Instead, a greater 
understanding of the phenomena underlying central coherence and greater 
definitional clarity might be achieved by investigating why tasks that tax a function 
considered impaired by weak central coherence should lead to such varied effects in 
the autistic population. One such function is the integration of information within 
context. Two examples of tasks thought to tax this function include the prototype 
effect tasks in the studies reported here and Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen's (2001) study, 
first discussed in Chapter 3. This required HFA participants to integrate object 
134 
fragments in order to identify and name an object. On the former task, HF A 
participants behaved like controls but on the latter task, HF A performance lagged 
behind. The mechanisms suggested in Chapter 3 could be directly investigated. For 
example, one possibility is that the impairments observed by Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen actually represented a deficit in late processing and that the identification and 
naming of the object is where the problem lies. This later process is absent from the 
prototype effect experiments reported in this thesis, and therefore, no difficulty in 
integrating information is apparent. 
As well as the implications for theoretical accounts, some individual 
findings reported in the experimental chapters could be explored further. Literature 
was discussed at the start of Chapter 4, suggesting that visual recognition memory 
was intact in HF A participants. This view was supported by the visual recognition 
test, using line drawings of representational objects reported in Experiment 3.1. 
However, when recognition memory for dot patterns was tested after one study trial, 
HFA participants performed worse than controls. This finding was interpreted as an 
impairment in recognising meaningless stimuli following Ameli et aI, (1988). 
Further research could constitute a direct comparison of meaningful and meaningless 
stimuli within the same experiment. A performance decrement on the meaningless 
stimuli would support this explanation further. Additionally, a manipulation of the 
number of learning trials used in the study phase, as well as a direct comparison 
between old and new stimuli would reinforce the findings of Experiment 4.1 that 
only old items are affected and that repeated learning trials ameliorate the lower 
recognition performance. An analysis of A' may also aid clarification by teasing 
apart which participant group differences are a result of alterations in memory 
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sensitivity, and which if any, can be attributed to use of a particular response 
criterion. 
Another proposal for future research made in Experiment 5.3 concerned the 
finding that category membership decisions are restricted in autism. The suggestion 
was that, initially, the findings would need replication using a greater number of 
arrays. Then the specific accounts for the findings suggested in Chapter 5 could be 
directly tested. These were that the reduced category membership decisions were a 
reflection of reduced similarity or that they reflected the operation of local detailed-
focussed processing. The two suggestions could be tested as follows: A category 
membership decision task, similar to that described in Experiment 5.3, could be 
completed together with a task that obtained similarity ratings between individual 
items and the canonical target item. If category membership decisions were 
restricted because of a reduced perception of similarity, then within-target category 
similarity ratings should be similar for both participants groups. However, 
intermediate items (i.e. those occupying objective mid-points between the target 
canonical item, such as the letter C and the non-target canonical item, such as letter 
0) in the array should receive lower similarity ratings from the autism participants 
than controls and be less likely to be included in the target category. 
If a focus on local processing was responsible for reduced category 
membership decisions, then the performance of controls could be brought to match 
that of the autism group, by removing the opportunity for global comparisons. This 
could be done by asking for single category membership judgements on a single item 
and providing only the target canonical item for reference without presenting other 
category members. 
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Once the pattern of findings presented in this thesis are considered en 
masse, together with other related studies another issue emerges which I shall argue 
is a research priority. This is the observation that prototype formation and the 
perception of similarity are both highly unstable within the autism population as a 
whole. This chapter has already discussed the discrepancy between findings of intact 
prototype effects (reported in Chapters 3 - 5) and studies that demonstrate failure to 
show a prototype effects (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Plaisted et aI., Submitted). 
Chapter 2, in addition, cited more conflicting evidence. On the one hand, Tager-
Flusberg (l985b) found that children with autism made categorisation decisions that 
were affected by prototypicality in a similar fashion to controls (i.e. the 
categorisation of prototypical items was more accurate than the categorisation of 
more peripheral items). Whereas, Dunn et aI. (1996) found that HFA children were 
not affected by prototypicality in the same manner as controls in a word fluency task. 
The perception of similarity appears also to be unstable. Several lines of 
evidence (reviewed in Chapter 2) suggest that individuals with autism do have a 
reduced perception of similarity. Whereas, the intact prototype effects reported in 
this thesis suggest that it not reduced and does not differ from that of controls. 
Further research into this instability is needed for several reasons. The 
causes are unknown. The underlying assumption presented in the experimental 
chapter has been that prototype formation is intact and any instability in the display 
of prototype effects is a result of interaction between individual abilities and the 
specific demands of the various tasks (e.g. the nature of test questions). This has led 
to a focus on methodology as a source of variation in the findings. The implication 
drawn from mixed findings on the perception of similarity has been that the mental 
function itself, the perception of similarity, is highly variable reduced on some 
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occasions, but not on others. However, the distinction is a false one. As prototype 
formation is thought to be predicated upon the perception of similarity then any 
variation in the latter should affect the former. In principle, also, task demands, 
unrelated to similarity perception may affect findings that are cited in contradiction 
of or support of claims of reduced similarity perception. No converging evidence 
has emerged from this thesis as to the underlying cause of the instability. 
Furthermore, neither theory on prototype formation or on the perception of 
similarity takes account of the possible existence of instability. Klinger and Dawson 
(2001) simply state that prototype formation is impaired, with no mention of the fact 
that it may be intact on occasion. Similarly, Plaisted (2001) implies that a reduction 
in the perception of similarity is a permanent state of affairs. Focusing firstly on why 
the latter should vary should give insight into variation in the former given the 
apparent dependence of prototype formation on similarity perception. 
Researching the causes of instability within similarity perception is a 
priority because knowledge of its causes and underlying mechanisms would assist in 
devising appropriate experiments to test the suggestions summarised earlier in this 
chapter. For example, one suggestion following from Experiment 5.3 required direct 
measurement of similarity perception. However, without some idea of why the 
perception of similarity might vary there is no way of knowing whether the actual 
measurement method is directly influencing the variable being measured. 
Furthermore, similarity appears to playa central role in many theories of 
cognition in addition to the conceptual and categorisation processes discussed in this 
thesis. As Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner write (1993) similarity " ... pervades 
theories of cognition". These include theories of problem solving, memory, and 
learning and contextual influence (Markman & Gentner, 1993; Medin et al., 1993). 
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Thus, it seems likely that a greater understanding of the perception of similarity in 
autism and the way that it fluctuates would lead to a more general understanding of 
cognition within this disorder. 
6.3 Overall Conclusion 
The research reported in this thesis has operated within the cognitive science 
paradigm, described in Chapter 1, to investigate concepts and categorisation in 
autism. In particular, a particular phenomenon of cognitive psychology, prototype 
effects, was employed to test the suggestion that prototype formation was impaired in 
autism (Klinger & Dawson, 2001). This prediction was supported also by other 
theories, weak central coherence (Frith, 1989; Frith & Happe, 1994), the reduced 
perception of similarity (Plaisted, 2001) as well as studies revealing prototype effect 
impairment in autism (Klinger & Dawson, 2001; Plaisted et aI., Submitted). 
No evidence for the prediction was found however. Protototype effects 
were obtained from the responses of HF A children on no less than five occasions. 
These findings have nonetheless given rise to a consideration of several issues. No 
support was found for the main theoretical accounts. The experimental findings 
demonstrated that prototype formation could be intact in autism, that the perception 
of similarity is not necessarily reduced, and that central coherence is not always 
weak (assuming the relevance of this particular theory). 
Other issues included the observation that the main strengths and limitations 
of the thesis seem to derive from the same decisions on design and experimental 
procedure. For example, the methodological variety presented both between the 
studies reported in this thesis and between these studies and other relevant ones, 
reported in the literature, all made the convergence of findings on intact prototype 
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effects quite robust. Additionally, this same variety generated several potential 
research avenues. However, this methodological variety also made it difficult to 
establish why other research groups obtained no prototype effects from their autism 
groups. Additionally, the participant group differences that were obtained in the 
thesis studies run the risk of being spurious owing to small sample sizes and lack of 
replication. 
Several ideas for future research were discussed within the experimental 
chapters. These included a further exploration of the suggestion that ambiguity was 
problematic for Klinger and Dawson's participants rather than prototype formation. 
Additionally, an investigation was proposed into the ability of individuals with 
autism to integrate information within context as well as one into impairments in 
visual recognition memory with meaningless materials. Finally, research suggestions 
were included as to why category membership decisions might be reduced in autism. 
An overview of the findings identified an emerging theme: that of instability 
of participant group differences on the display of prototype effects and of the 
perception of similarity. It was argued that investigating the cause of instability in 
similarity should be a research priority. Several reasons were provided in support. 
No evidence or theoretical account currently exists to explain this phenomenon and 
understanding it would provide useful if not essential information for any of the 
research ideas proposed within the experimental chapters. Additionally 
understanding how the perception of similarity might vary within the autism 
population is likely to lead to broader insights into cognition within autism, in 
addition to the causes of instability in the display of prototype effects. In short, the 
experimental evidence presented in this thesis has resulted in a change of research 
question from "do individuals with autism show prototype effects?" to "what causes 
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instability (in participant group differences) in the perception of similarity by 
individuals with autism?" 
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Appendix A: Participants' data from Experiments 3.1 - 3.3 
KEY 
Column Description 
heading 
Id Participant identity number 
group Participant group: 1 = high functioning autism; 2 = control 
diagnosis Diagnosis of participants with autism: 1 = autism; 2 = Asperger 
syndrome 
ca_yrs Chronological age (years) 
bpvs Raw scores from the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 
vma_yrs Verbal mental age derived from BPVS raw scores (years) 
rvns Raw scores from the Ravens Progressive Matrices test 
memory Memory task scores 
order Presentation order of average category task and modal category task: I = 
average category task first; 2 = modal category task first 
av _p Average category prototype proportion of positive recognition 
responses (PPRR) 
av _h Average category high family resemblance (FR) exemplar PPRR 
av _mo Average category medium FR exemplar (old) PPRR 
av_mn Average category medium FR exemplar (new) PPRR 
av _1 Average category low FR exemplar PPRR 
mod_p Modal category prototype PPRR 
mod_h Modal category high FR exemplar PPRR 
mod_mo Modal category medium FR exemplar (old) PPRR 
mod_mn Modal category medium FR exemplar (new) PPRR 
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id group diagnosis ca _yrs bpvs vma _yrs rvns Memory order av Ｎｾ＠ av h av mo 
1 1.00 1.00 8.75 86.00 8.42 36.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
2 1.00 2.00 9.58 83.00 8.08 33.00 0.94 2.00 0.50 0.63 0.75 
3 1.00 1.00 10.50 99.00 10.17 28.00 0.81 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 
I 4 1.00 2.00 11.17 118.00 13.08 52.00 0.94 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 
5 1.00 1.00 11.17 129.00 15.17 29.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 
6 1.00 1.00 12.08 98.00 10.08 38.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.13 
7 1.00 2.00 12.25 119.00 13.42 35.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.50 
8 1.00 2.00 12.33 123.00 14.00 38.00 0.69 2.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 
9 1.00 1.00 12.58 100.00 10.42 51.00 0.75 2.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 
10 1.00 2.00 12.75 108.00 11.58 37.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 
11 1.00 1.00 13.08 116.00 12.75 42.00 0.81 2.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
12 1.00 2.00 13.25 126.00 14.58 38.00 0.81 2.00 1.00 0.88 0.38 
13 1.00 2.00 13.42 145.00 17.00 46.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 
14 1.00 2.00 13.92 103.00 10.83 32.00 0.88 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
15 1.00 1.00 8.83 58.00 5.67 39.00 0.94 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 
16 2.00 8.50 91.00 9.00 21.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 
17 2.00 9.75 82.00 8.00 44.00 0.94 2.00 1.00 0.88 0.63 
18 2.00 10.58 96.00 9.83 38.00 0.94 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.88 
19 2.00 11.50 114.00 12.42 31.00 0.69 2.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 
20 2.00 10.92 132.00 15.67 45.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 
21 2.00 12.33 97.00 9.92 22.00 0.94 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.50 
22 2.00 12.42 110.00 11.83 32.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 
23 2.00 12.33 125.00 14.42 43.00 1.00 2.00 0.50 0.88 0.75 
24 2.00 12.50 97.00 9.92 44.00 0.88 2.00 1.00 0.88 0.63 
25 2.00 13.25 107.00 11.33 42.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 
26 2.00 12.83 112.00 12.08 43.00 0.88 2.00 1.00 0.88 0.75 
27 2.00 13.42 126.00 14.58 43.00 0.88 2.00 1.00 0.63 0.63 
28 2.00 13.00 140.00 17.00 42.00 0.69 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.88 
29 2.00 14.17 102.00 10.67 24.00 0.69 2.00 0.50 0.63 0.75 
30 2.00 8.42 61.00 6.00 12.00 0.44 2.00 0.50 0.88 0.75 
._--
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Id av mn av I mod _p mod h mod mo mod mn mod I 
1 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.50 0.50 
2 0.75 0.13 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.88 0.38 
3 0.75 0.63 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.13 
4 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.38 0.25 0.38 
5 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.75 0.50 
6 0.63 0.13 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.13 0.38 
7 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.38 0.25 0.25 
8 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.63 
9 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.88 0.25 0.38 0.13 
10 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.38 0.38 0.00 
11 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.38 
12 0.63 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.13 0.13 
13 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.25 
14 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.63 0.38 
15 0.88 0.13 
16 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.38 
17 0.88 0.13 0.50 0.88 0.75 0.13 0.38 
18 0.75 0.13 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.13 
19 0.75 0.63 1.00 0.88 0.75 0.75 0.50 
20 0.63 0.13 0.50 0.75 0.38 0.38 0.50 
21 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.63 0.50 0.50 
22 0.63 0.13 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.38 0.13 
23 0.63 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.38 
24 0.75 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.63 0.88 0.63 
25 0.63 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.13 0.50 0.50 
26 0.88 0.13 1.00 0.75 0.63 0.50 0.75 
27 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.38 0.38 0.25 
28 0.75 0.00 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.38 0.25 
29 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.88 0.25 0.38 0.38 
30 1.00 1.00 
_.-
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Appendix B: Practice memory test - study stimuli 
o 
c:=:::J 
CJ c:=:::J 
ｾｏ ｾ ｉｉ＠ｾ＠ CJ c:=:::J 
CJ c:=:::J 
c:=:::J 
ｾ＠
D D r 
D D 
r 
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Appendix C: Practice memory test - test stimuli 
o 
= 
= = ＼ｪｏ ｾ＠ = = = = = = = = = = = = 
= = = = = 
= = c:==J 
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Appendix D: Memory test - study stimuli 
8 
I 
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Appendix E: Memory test - test stimuli 
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170 
Experiment 3.2 
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Appendix F: Prototype effect test - average study stimuli 
ALL MEDIUM FR ITEMS 
Insect category 
172 
173 
Monster category 
174 
175 
Appendix G: Prototype effect test - average test stimuli 
INSECT CATEGORY 
Old medium FR items 
176 
Bottom: prototype; remainder: high FR items 
177 
New medium FR items 
178 
Low FR items 
179 
MONSTER CATEGORY 
Old medium FR items 
180 
Bottom: prototype; remainder: high FR items 
181 
New medium FR items 
182 
Low FR items 
183 
Experiment 3.3 
184 
Appendix H: Prototype effect test - modal study stimuli 
MEDIUM FR ITEMS 
Bird category 
185 
186 
Animal category 
187 
188 
Appendix I: Prototype effecttest - modal test stimuli 
BIRD CATEGORY 
Old medium FR items 
189 
Top: prototype,' remainder: high FR items 
190 
New medium FR items 
191 
Low FR items 
192 
ANIMAL CATEGORY 
Old medium FR items 
193 
Top: prototype; remainder: high FR items 
194 
New medium FR items 
195 
Low FR items 
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Appendix J: Participants' data from Experiment 4.1 
KEY 
Column heading 
Id 
Group 
Diagnosis 
bpvs 
rvns 
order 
tlrecmo 
tirech 
tirecmn 
tIred 
ticatmo 
ticath 
ticatmn 
tlcad 
t6study_I 
t6study_2 
t6study_3 
t6study_ 4 
t6study_5 
t6study_6 
Description 
Participant identity number 
Participant group: I = autism; 2 = control 
Diagnosis of participants with high functioning autism: 
I = autism; 2 = Asperger syndrome 
Chronological age (years) 
Raw scores from the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS) 
Verbal mental age derived from BPVS raw scores 
(years) 
Raw scores from the Ravens Progressive Matrices test 
Presentation order of conditions: I = one-trial condition 
first; 2 = six-trial condition first 
Proportion of correct categorisation responses (PCCR) 
during the one-trial study condition 
Proportion of positive recognition responses (PPRR) 
during the one-trial test condition 
· .. mo = old medium family resemblance (FR) exemplars 
· .. h = high FR exemplars 
... mn = new medium FR exemplars 
· .. 1 = low FR exemplars 
PCCR during the one-trial test condition 
... mo = old medium FR exemplars 
... h = high FR exemplars 
· .. mn = new medium FR exemplars 
· . .1 = low FR exemplars 
PCCR during the six-trial study condition 
... n = trial number 
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KEY continued. 
Column heading 
t6recmo 
t6rech 
t6recmn 
t6rec1 
t6catmo 
t6cath 
t6catmn 
t6catl 
Description 
PPRR during six-trial test condition 
· .. mo = old medium FR exemplars 
... h = high FR exemplars 
... mn = new medium FR exemplars 
· . .1 = low FR exemplars 
PCCR during six -trial test condition 
· .. mo = old medium FR exemplars 
· .. h = high FR exemplars 
... mn = new medium FR exemplars 
· . .1 = low FR exemplars 
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id group diagnosi ca "yrs bpvs vma _yrs rvns order t1study_ 1 t1recmo t1rech t1recmn 
1 1.00 2.00 10.00 113.00 12.33 52.00 1.00 10.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 
2 1.00 2.00 12.00 129.00 15.17 31.00 2.00 9.00 5.00 7.00 4.00 
3 1.00 2.00 13.25 123.00 14.08 44.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 
4 1.00 2.00 13.33 105.00 11.08 23.00 2.00 9.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 
5 1.00 2.00 13.25 132.00 15.67 49.00 1.00 9.00 3.00 6.00 4.00 
6 1.00 1.00 16.08 124.00 14.25 42.00 1.00 7.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 
7 1.00 1.00 12.58 110.00 11.83 43.00 2.00 9.00 1.00 2.00 5.00 
8 1.00 1.00 11.42 101.00 10.58 25.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 
9 1.00 2.00 10.42 94.00 9.58 39.00 2.00 7.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 
10 1.00 1.00 11.17 109.00 11.67 24.00 2.00 6.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
11 1.00 2.00 12.00 133.00 15.83 50.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 
12 1.00 2.00 15.58 135.00 16.17 53.00 2.00 8.00 3.00 6.00 5.00 
13 1.00 2.00 16.50 108.00 11.58 40.00 1.00 6.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 
14 1.00 2.00 12.42 126.00 14.58 27.00 2.00 11.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 
15 1.00 2.00 12.50 117.00 13.00 35.00 2.00 6.00 4.00 1.00 6.00 
16 1.00 2.00 14.00 125.00 14.42 38.00 1.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
17 1.00 2.00 12.50 152.00 17.00 51.00 2.00 10.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 
18 1.00 2.00 14.92 134.00 16.00 46.00 1.00 9.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 
19 2.00 13.08 101.00 10.58 45.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 6.00 
20 2.00 12.58 119.00 13.33 41.00 2.00 7.00 8.00 0.00 3.00 
21 2.00 11.83 126.00 14.58 44.00 2.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 
22 2.00 12.83 125.00 14.42 37.00 2.00 10.00 7.00 2.00 2.00 
23 2.00 12.92 120.00 13.50 43.00 2.00 10.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 
24 2.00 10.58 97.00 9.92 42.00 ___ 2.0<L ｾ＠ __ 8.0_<L ｾ＠ ｾＮｏｏ＠ _ _ 3.00 _ ___ 5.00 
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id group diaQnosi ca _yrs bpvs vma _yrs rvns order t1study 1 t1recmo t1rech t1recmn 
25 2.00 10.92 94.00 9.58 35.00 1.00 9.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 
26 2.00 11.33 97.00 9.92 31.00 2.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 4.00 
27 2.00 10.33 105.00 11.08 34.00 1.00 6.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 
28 2.00 11.92 134.00 16.00 50.00 1.00 9.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 
29 2.00 12.08 108.00 11.58 46.00 2.00 9.00 4.00 8.00 4.00 
30 2.00 13.83 126.00 14.58 46.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 3.00 6.00 
31 2.00 13.00 136.00 16.33 46.00 2.00 9.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 
32 2.00 12.58 135.00 16.17 57.00 2.00 10.00 6.00 5.00 7.00 
33 2.00 14.67 139.00 16.83 48.00 1.00 9.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 
34 2.00 15.17 117.00 13.00 46.00 1.00 10.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 
35 2.00 16.33 110.00 11.83 40.00 1.00 9.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 
36 2.00 _ ＱＵＮＰｾ｟＠ ＱＲＶＮＰｾｌＭ 14.58 51.00 1.00 9.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 
-
201 
id t1recl t1catmo t1cath t1catmn t1catl t6study. 1 t6study_ 2 t6study_ 3 t6study.4 t6study.5 t6study_ 6 
1 4.00 6.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 12.00 10.00 10.00 
2 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 11.00 7.00 12.00 10.00 
3 4.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 10.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 
4 3.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 10.00 10.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 11.00 
5 3.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 11.00 10.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 
6 5.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 6.00 7.00 11.00 11.00 8.00 12.00 12.00 
7 0.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 4.00 7.00 8.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
8 6.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 7.00 5.00 8.00 5.00 6.00 
9 3.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 8.00 10.00 5.00 5.00 9.00 8.00 
10 0.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 8.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 
11 3.00 7.00 4.00 2.00 7.00 9.00 2.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 
12 5.00 7.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 11.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
13 4.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 7.00 7.00 4.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 
14 4.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 
15 0.00 6.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 7.00 
16 5.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 7.00 
17 0.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 5.00 7.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 
18 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 8.00 10.00 11.00 11.00 10.00 11.00 
19 3.00 6.00 5.00 1.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
20 1.00 5.00 4.00 2.00 6.00 5.00 10.00 8.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 
21 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 4.00 8.00 11.00 10.00 9.00 5.00 6.00 
22 2.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 9.00 7.00 11.00 11.00 10.00 9.00 
23 4.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 
24 4.00 7.00 7.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 5.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 
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id t1recl t1catmo t1cath t1catmn t1 cat! t6study_ 1 t6study_ 2 t6study_ 3 t6study_ 4 t6study_ 5 t6study_ 6 
25 3.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 8.00 9.00 
26 6.00 4.00 6.00 5.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 7.00 
27 5.00 3.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 7.00 8.00 7.00 10.00 9.00 
28 2.00 6.00 7.00 5.00 6.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 
29 0.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 5.00 10.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 
30 2.00 8.00 6.00 7.00 5.00 9.00 8.00 11.00 9.00 12.00 12.00 
31 2.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 7.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 
32 5.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 7.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 I 
33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 7.00 8.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 
34 3.00 5.00 8.00 6.00 7.00 5.00 7.00 6.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 
35 2.00 6.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 9.00 11.00 12.00 
36 1.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 11.00 
- -
203 
id t6recmo t6rech t6recmn t6recl t6catmo t6cath t6catmn t6catl 
1 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 
2 4.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 
3 5.00 4.00 5.00 2.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 
4 8.00 5.00 6.00 0.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 
5 7.00 4.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 
6 4.00 3.00 5.00 2.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 4.00 
7 4.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 6.00 
8 4.00 5.00 7.00 7.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
9 6.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 0.00 
10 4.00 0.00 2.00 0.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 
11 6.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 
12 8.00 7.00 5.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 3.00 
13 5.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 
14 6.00 6.00 7.00 2.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 
15 6.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 6.00 3.00 7.00 5.00 
16 3.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 
17 7.00 7.00 2.00 0.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 
18 6.00 7.00 5.00 2.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 
19 8.00 8.00 4.00 1.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 5.00 
20 3.00 5.00 4.00 0.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 
21 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
22 7.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 
23 6.00 7.00 7.00 2.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 
24 5.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 
- --- '----------
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· id t6recmo t6rech t6recmn t6recl t6catmo t6cath t6catmn t6catl 
I 25 2.00 7.00 1.00 0.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 
I 26 3.00 4.00 5.00 2.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 6.00 
, 27 5.00 4.00 7.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 4.00 5.00 
28 7.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 7.00 
29 6.00 5.00 3.00 1.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 
30 6.00 6.00 4.00 3.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 
31 7.00 4.00 2.00 0.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 5.00 
32 4.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 
33 5.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 7.00 
34 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 2.00 
35 4.00 2.00 6.00 6.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 
36 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 7.00 6.00 8.00 6.00 
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Appendix K: Practice stimuli 
Top 2 rows - study session; bottom 2 rows - test session 
o o o o 
D D D D 
o o • 
D o • 
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Appendix L: Stimuli for instruction sheet 
ALL ARE MEDIUM FR ITEMS. 
Top row: Category E; bottom row: Category F 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • •• • • • • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
• • • • 
• • 
• 
• • • • • • •• • •• 
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Appendix M: Study stimuli 
ALL ARE MEDIUM FR ITEMS 
First two rows: Category A; second two rows - Category B 
o 0
0 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
. 
o 
208 
o 
o 
0
0 
First two rows: Category C; second two rows: Category D 
o 
00 
o 
. 
o 
00 
00 
o 0 0 
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Appendix N: Test stimuli 
CATEGORY A 
From top to bottom: r t row - old medium FR items; r row - high FR items; 
Jrd row - new medium FR items; 4th row -low FR items 
• 
.. 
.. 
• 
.. 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • 
• 
210 
• 
. . 
• 
. 
. 
• 
. . 
• 
CATEGORYB 
From top to bottom: r t row - old medium FR items; r row - high FR items; 
Jrd row - new medium FR items; 4th row -low FR items 
• • 
. 
• 
.. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• 
. . . . . 
.. 
. . 
-... 
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CATEGORYC 
From top to bottom: r t row - old medium FR items; 2"" row - high FR items; 
JTd row - new medium FR items; 4th row -low FR items 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
. . 
• 
• 
.. 
• -. 
--
• 
• 
• 
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CATEGORYD 
From top to bottom: r t row - old medium FR items; 2"" row - high FR items; 
Jrd row - new medium FR items; 4th row -low FR items 
• 
... • 
• 
• 
•• 
• 
.. 
.. . . 
' . 
• 
• . . • 
. .. 
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. 
. 
. 
. 
.. 
Appendix to Chapter 5 
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Appendix 0: Participants' data from Experiments 5.1- 5.3 
KEY 
Column 
Heading 
Id 
Group 
Diagnosis 
bpvs 
gender 
order 
prot 
med 
low 
ps 
pn 
pmd_letc 
pmd_Ieth 
pmd_sqr 
pmd_cel 
qwording 
Description 
Participant identity number 
Participant group: 1 = high functioning autism; 2 = control 
Diagnosis of participants with autism: 1 = autism; 2 = 
Asperger syndrome 
Chronological age (years) 
Raw scores from the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 
Verbal mental age derived from BPVS raw scores (years) 
1 = male; 2 = female 
Presentation order of control tasks: 1 = shapes task first; 2 = 
numbers task first 
Prototype choice proportion 
Medium family resemblance (FR) choice proportion 
Low FR choice proportion 
Proportion of shapes scores 
Proportion of numbers scores 
Chronological age (years) at start of Experiment 5.3 
Verbal mental age (years) at start of Experiment 5.3 
Proportion of membership decisions for 
· . .letc = the letter C target category 
· . .leth = the letter H target category 
· .. sqr = the square target category 
· .. cel = the cirele target category 
Question wording used in Experiment 5.3: 1 = one question 
per item in each array - for example: 'Is this a letter C?'; 2 = 
one question per array - for example: ' ... show me all the ones 
that are a letter C ... ?' 
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id group diagnosis ca _yrs bpvs vma _yrs .9_ender order prot med low ps 
1 1.00 1.00 9.42 69.00 6.75 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.88 
2 1.00 1.00 9.92 92.00 9.08 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.96 
3 1.00 2.00 10.92 84.00 8.17 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.88 
4 1.00 2.00 15.67 135.00 16.17 1.00 2.00 0.33 0.50 0.17 0.92 
5 1.00 2.00 12.58 116.00 12.83 1.00 2.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.92 
6 1.00 2.00 12.83 102.00 10.67 2.00 2.00 0.17 0.17 0.67 0.96 
7 1.00 1.00 10.58 73.00 7.17 1.00 1.00 0.17 0.50 0.33 1.00 
8 1.00 1.00 14.42 103.00 10.83 2.00 1.00 0.67 0.17 0.17 1.00 
9 1.00 1.00 13.67 131.00 15.50 1.00 2.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
10 1.00 2.00 14.33 103.00 10.83 1.00 2.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
11 1.00 2.00 10.50 89.00 8.75 1.00 2.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
12 1.00 2.00 13.25 107.00 11.33 1.00 2.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 
13 1.00 2.00 15.00 145.00 17.00 1.00 2.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 
14 1.00 2.00 13.92 117.00 13.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
15 1.00 2.00 15.17 97.00 9.92 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 
16 1.00 2.00 15.33 151.00 17.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 
17 1.00 2.00 14.00 123.00 14.08 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 1.00 
18 1.00 2.00 14.92 145.00 17.00 1.00 2.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 
19 2.00 11.50 87.00 8.58 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.17 1.00 
20 2.00 11.08 117.00 13.00 1.00 2.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 
21 2.00 12.83 115.00 12.58 1.00 2.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 1.00 
22 2.00 13.75 134.00 16.00 1.00 2.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
23 2.00 9.92 92.00 9.08 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00 
24 2.00 10.67 76.00 7.42 1.00 ＮＱＭＰｾ＠ __ 0.33 _ -.9.33 _ o..}3 ____ 1.00 , 
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--
id grouJ! diagnosis ca _yrs bpvs vma _yrs gender order prot med low ps 
25 2.00 10.75 102.00 10.67 2.00 2.00 0.33 0.50 0.17 1.00 
26 2.00 10.67 85.00 8.33 1.00 2.00 0.17 0.33 0.50 1.00 
27 2.00 13.08 107.00 11.33 1.00 2.00 0.17 0.67 0.17 1.00 
28 2.00 9.58 88.00 8.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.17 1.00 
29 2.00 14.17 103.00 10.83 1.00 2.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
30 2.00 14.25 113.00 12.33 2.00 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.17 1.00 
31 2.00 15.42 138.00 16.67 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
32 2.00 14.00 113.00 12.33 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.17 0.17 1.00 
33 2.00 15.58 118.00 13.08 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
34 2.00 14.17 141.00 17.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
35 2.00 15.50 144.00 17.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 
36 2.00 14.92 150.00 17.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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--
id pn ea .yrs1 vma .yrs1 pmd lete pmd leth pmd sqr pmd eel qwording 
1 0.92 10.75 7.83 0.33 0.83 0.17 0.50 1.00 
2 1.00 9.92 9.08 0.00 
3 1.00 10.92 8.17 0.00 
4 1.00 15.67 16.17 0.00 
5 1.00 13.17 13.33 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.00 
6 0.88 13.50 11.33 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.00 
7 0.54 11.92 8.08 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.33 1.00 
8 1.00 15.83 12.08 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.33 1.00 
9 0.96 13.67 15.50 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 
10 1.00 15.67 12.00 0.00 
11 1.00 10.50 8.75 0.00 
12 1.00 13.92 12.00 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.00 
13 0.96 15.00 17.00 0.00 
14 1.00 13.92 13.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.17 0.00 
15 1.00 15.17 9.92 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 
16 1.00 15.33 17.00 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.00 
17 1.00 14.00 14.08 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.00 I 
18 1.00 14.92 17.00 0.50 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 I 
19 1.00 11.50 8.58 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.00 
20 1.00 11.08 13.00 0.83 0.67 1.00 0.17 0.00 
21 1.00 12.83 12.58 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.33 0.00 
22 1.00 13.75 16.00 0.33 0.17 0.67 0.17 0.00 
23 1.00 9.92 9.08 0.50 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.00 
24 1.00 10.67 7.42 0.67 __ 0.50_ 0.50 0.17 0.00 
- -
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id pn ea _yrs1 vma _Yf"s1 pmd lete pmd leth pmd sqr pmd eel qwording 
25 0.96 10.75 10.67 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.33 0.00 
26 1.00 10.67 8.33 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.50 0.00 
27 1.00 13.08 11.33 0.50 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.00 
28 1.00 9.58 8.67 0.33 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.00 
29 1.00 14.17 10.83 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.17 0.00 
30 1.00 14.25 12.33 0.67 0.17 1.00 0.33 0.00 
31 1.00 15.42 16.67 0.50 0.33 1.00 0.17 0.00 
32 1.00 14.00 12.33 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.33 0.00 
33 1.00 15.58 13.08 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.17 0.00 
34 1.00 14.17 17.00 0.33 0.17 1.00 0.17 0.00 
35 1.00 15.50 17.00 0.83 0.50 1.00 0.17 0.00 
36 1.00 14.92 17.00 0.83 0.83 1·00 _ 0.33 0.00 I 
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Experiment 5.1 
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Appendix P: Prototype effect test Study stimuli 
ALL MEDIUM FR ITEMS 
Hov category 
221 
222 
Raz category 
223 
224 
Mek category 
225 
226 
Gip category 
227 
228 
Dut category 
229 
230 
Be! category 
231 
232 
Appendix Q: Prototype effect test Test stimuli 
ALL FROM SET A 
Top: Hov category: From left to right -low FR, medium FR, prototype 
Bottom: Raz category: From left to right - prototype, medium FR, low FR 
D D 
D 
o 
o 
233 
D 
Top: Mek category: From left to right -low FR, prototype, medium FR 
Bottom: Gip category: From left to right - medium FR, prototype, low FR 
o 
o 
D 
ｾ＠
----
o 
o 
o 
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Top: Dut category: From left to right - prototype, low FR, medium FR 
Bottom: Be! category: From left to right - medium FR, low FR, prototype 
:i_ 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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Experiment 5.2 
236 
Appendix R: Shapes test materials 
ALL SET A 
Arrays from top to bottom: letter C to letter 0, letter H to letter A, square to 
diamond, and circle to oval 
oocooo 
I I D D D 
f1AAHHA 
o ｾ＠ D ｾ＠ D D 
000000 
D D D D 
000000 
I 
i_ D n 
237 
D D 
Appendix S: Numbers test materials 
ALL SET A 
English 
Mark John Mary Ian Sue David 
18 80 29 86 88 10 I 
--
Maths 
Sarah Mike Kate Anna Stuart Will 
69 84 24 17 70 37 
- ｾ＠
--
Science 
Rob 1 Sally Alan Flo Vera David 
14 1 27 99 36 53 100 -
French 
Jenny I Jordan Jerry Alice James Claire 
59 J 56 58 94 3 32 -
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